

3. Before discussing the Swedish proposals more in detail, some important conditions will be considered.

(a) The Swedish delegation is aware that its suggestions concern much more of purely military matters usually guarded by strict secrecy measures, than would a convention banning only development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. However, since the ultimate goal is the final abolition of chemical warfare, the Swedish delegation is convinced that normal military secrecy in relation to specific measures required for a chemical warfare capability need not be upheld in the long run.

(b) It is often argued that since a protective capability against chemical weapons would be allowed, it would in practice be possible to disguise efforts to obtain a capability to use chemical weapons among allowed efforts to acquire or maintain such a protective capability. There are indeed particular activities which do not fall within the area of general protection, such as training of flight behaviour or munition transportation directives (see Annex I). Sweden therefore believes that the opportunities offered by the distinction that can thus be made should be explored in order to obtain an effective prohibition.

(c) An option inherent in Sweden's approach is the possibility to increase significantly the effectiveness of the verification of compliance with the convention. If a greater number of activities were covered by a prohibition, this would clearly increase the possibilities to verify compliance thereof. It would also improve the grounds on which the Parties might adhere to or continue adherence to the convention. Examples of the activities to be monitored are given in Annex I.

(d) It is sometimes argued that the most effective way to secure the abolition of chemical warfare would be to prohibit also protective measures. It must be recalled, however, that a very long time would be needed to implement provisions concerning, inter alia, destruction of existent stockpiles of chemical weapons. Obviously during such a time many States would want to retain their capacity for protection against chemical weapons. If protective measures were to be prohibited from the outset, it would imply a diminished security for those States for whom chemical weapons at present have a military significance and might cause them not to adhere to a treaty in the foreseeable future. This would obviously detract from the value of the convention.

To this must be added that a certain capacity, military as well as civilian, will always be necessary to protect against accidents and catastrophes involving poisonous chemical substances, not intended for use as chemical weapons.

4. A prohibition of a capability to use chemical weapons would require specific undertakings to be spelled out in annexes to a convention. The following are possible examples of such undertakings:

- to declare the content of, or the non-existence of, doctrines, manuals and chains of command for the use of chemical weapons;
- to declare schools, training facilities and curricula intended for teaching the use of chemical weapons;
- to declare weapons production and training plans. (Items that might be included in such declarations would concern munition handling instructions, including labelling practices, artillery firing tables, air plane flying and bombing instructions, etc.);