

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

The draft convention text in appendix I has been enhanced by the addition of two annexes - one on confidentiality and the other on chemicals; by new articles on ratification, accession and entry into force; and by new material on activities of the preparatory commission. Additionally, some issues in articles VIII and IX concerning the organization and procedures for clarifying concerns of States parties have been resolved.

Appendix II of our report reflects the results of many long and intensive discussions on very difficult, important issues that required a delicate balance of the security and political concerns of all countries participating in these negotiations. Discussions on the composition and function of the Executive Council have taken place for a number of years. This year, however, following intensive consultations, the Chairman has summarized, in appendix II text, various proposals for the Executive Council in order to help guide our future discussions on this subject. On the issue of challenge inspection, the Chairman made a truly commendable effort toward achieving consensus on the principle of mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection, however, delegations still do not fully agree. Difficulties remain over how to protect sensitive non-chemical-weapons military and civilian facilities while at the same time providing satisfaction with regard to compliance. The Chairman's work on challenge inspection in appendix II reflects both the progress and remaining difficulties and, along with the previous work on this subject, will serve as a good basis for further discussion.

We are deeply conscious of the need to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the Earth as soon as possible. This is a matter of security for all countries. In the world today, security against chemical attack takes a variety of forms. During the 10-year period after the convention enters into force, a transition will take place from security based on that variety of forms to one based on the convention. A number of countries have raised concerns about how to ensure security during that period, while some chemical weapons, albeit a diminishing amount still exist in national arsenals. Many of the issues we have been discussing in the CD have dealt with security during the transition period from a variety of interrelated perspectives - the order of destruction, reservations, assistance and protection in the event of CW use, measures to deter non-compliance, and incentives to encourage all CW-capable States to join the convention. I believe we can and must find arrangements, consistent with the objectives of the convention, that will relieve the concerns of all States. In view of the complexity of the security factor, several different provisions may be necessary to resolve all the concerns.

It is the hope of the United States delegation that when our work resumes during the inter-sessional period and again in 1990, further attention will be given to these interrelated security issues and that ways will be found to address all concerns. Resolution of these issues is important in helping to achieve the necessary universality of the convention.