

tem, and which are themselves strategical lines of defence. First of these Eastward is that along the St. Lawrence extending from Toronto to Cornwall thence to Rouse's Point, and to some point at or near Lennoxville that would cover the Grand Trunk and prevent any movement by the Kennebec and Chaudiere rivers—holding the communications with Quebec through Richmond, &c. This line requires 91,000 men for nine posts, and it has the whole force of the frontier counties in Upper Canada with all of Lower Canada, except 15,000 men required for service at Montreal. The counties in Upper Canada to which this line belongs are :

Ontario.....	11,792
Durham.....	10,632
Victoria.....	9,618
Northumberland.....	12,147
Peterborough.....	7,573
Hastings.....	12,914
Prince Edward.....	5,661
Addington.....	8,206
Frontenac.....	8,545
Leeds.....	9,778
Grenville.....	6,320
Dundas.....	4,947
Stormont.....	4,689
Glengarry.....	5,486

118,308

Add 286,867 for Lower Canada, and there is a gross total of 405,175, less 25 per cent or 303,881 efficient men off which 15,000 must be taken to garrison Montreal, and there will be, to cover this line, 288,881 men, leaving a reserve of 197,881, after having fully manned all the posts. Of this force the posts in Upper Canada require 31,000 men, leaving a reserve there of 57,731 effective men between Toronto and Cornwall—the total reserve in the Lower Province will be 140,150 men, with every position occupied.

The last and most important line is that of the Ottawa, requiring a reserve force of 50,000 men at the capital. The force that can be provided from the counties immediately surrounding the city will be as follows, viz:

Prescott.....	3,943
Russell.....	3,175
Carleton.....	8,090
Lanark.....	8,448
Renfrew.....	6,187
City of Ottawa.....	4,327

Total..... 33,970

Deducting 25 per cent, those counties furnish but 25,478 men, which may be looked on as a reserve. The force thus held will be as follows:

Reserve, in Western Peninsula.....	41,096
“ on Southern Frontier.....	57,731
“ in Lower Canada, less 24,522	
to complete the reserve at Ottawa.....	115,628
“ at Ottawa.....	50,000

Total..... 264,455

In the field, Western Peninsula.....	117,750
“ Southern Frontier.....	31,000
“ Eastern Frontier.....	75,000

Total..... 488,205

As all these calculations are based on the census of 1861; no allowance has been made for the increase of population since; it would be safe to say that 500,000 men could be put in the field by a judicious course of management, and our neighbors would consider the question maturely before they would meddle with such a force.

All depots and collection of stores should be removed from the frontier towns. The armories and stores of the local militia should be placed as centrally as possible in the com-

pany districts into which each battalion would be divided, so that the simultaneous capture or destruction of the arms of a single battalion would be impossible without its concurrence or annihilation.

The means of defence at the disposal of the people of this province, apart from the question of munitions of war, are incalculably greater than superficial observers are willing to allow, and their value is enhanced by the fact that a winter campaign is impossible under any circumstances. With military operations confined to six months in each year, the problem of defence is considerably narrowed, and it is a question affecting the integrity and position of the British Empire as well as these provinces. If Gibraltar is the exponent of power and supremacy in Europe, Canada holds precisely the same position in America, with the double advantage of being a source of strength without expense. As a vital point of the Empire, our duty is plainly to prepare for such defensive measures as will make all attacks, whether by Fenians or their abettors, abortive; and by the wholesome check we will be enabled to place on the more ambitious of the politicians of the neighboring republic, remove the chance and temptation to form combinations inimical to British supremacy, and dangerous to the peace and freedom of the world.

All those measures can be effected without adding to the burdens of our people, or without occupying their time needlessly. There is nothing singular in advocating the general arming of such portions of the people of these provinces as are able to discharge the duties of militia soldiers. The people of Great Britain are beginning to awake to a sense of the value of similar organization; and in a country where the question of defence—not aggression—has to be considered, it is the best and safest method of proceeding. A regular army is only necessary for defending distant possessions, and carrying the horrors of war from the doors of the people who employ them; but in our case there are no possessions to defend, and we have neither the wish nor the inclination to carry war into our neighbor's territory. It is simply a question of defence with us, and every able-bodied man in these provinces is personally interested therein.

#### THE SNIDER RIFLE.

In Committee of Supply, General Peel, in the course of his speech on the Army Estimates, said: So long back as 1864 the committee on the subject decided that the whole of the British Army should be armed with breech loaders, and that they should be rifled on the Lancaster principle. The consequence was that there was not a single new rifle manufactured for the last three years. It was then decided that, instead of making new rifles, the Enfield rifle should be converted into a breech-loader; and before I came into office the pattern and ammunition were decided on. I decided to go on in the conversion of the Enfield guns as quickly as possible, and I have been able to convert 200,000 in the course of the present year. (Hear, hear.) When I came into office the number converted was only 12, and converted, not by machinery, but by hand. In all experiments there is a great difference when arms are made by skilled men under favourable circumstances and when they are manufactured expeditiously and in large quantities,

and it was intended to have the converted rifles manufactured in sufficient numbers in order that they might be placed in the hands of the troops. Unfortunately, there came just at the time a demand from the Governor-General of Canada for an instant supply of breech-loaders, not only for the British troops in Canada, but also for the Volunteers there. Consequently, the gun factory was obliged to be carried on even on Sundays, and we succeeded in sending out converted Sniders for every British soldier in Canada. (Hear, hear.) In the meantime I sent 60 down to Hythe to be tried, and the first report was to the effect that the shooting was more than favourable. Shortly afterwards the head of the laboratory came to me and said that when the ammunition made by machinery, instead of carefully by hand, was an explosion of gas. If the fault had been in the gun I would at any risk have stopped the conversion of the Enfield rifle, for it was my wish to place the best arm in the hands of the British soldier. With the six-groove rifle this ammunition shot beautifully; with the three-groove rifle it was a failure. It was found that the ball must be made slightly longer. The advantage of the breech-loader is not in accuracy but in rapidity, and I am happy to say, from the last accounts I have received, there is not the slightest doubt that in this rifle now being converted into the Snider you will have as good, if not a better weapon than any other country has got. (Hear, hear.) I yesterday received a letter from my noble friend Lord Strathnairn, than whom there is no better judge, in which he says:—

“ I had a field-day yesterday—all the troops with Sniders. The rapidity and uninterruptedness of the fire were remarkable—not a check. I had to caution them to fire slowly, to prevent running short of cartridges.”

This will, I think, prove to the committee that we are going in the right direction in converting the Enfield into the Snider breech-loaders for the whole British Army. I don't mean to say there may not be improvements in the cartridge; but there is now provision made in the estimates for the present year to convert 350,000, and there I would recommend conversion to stop. I should not recommend the conversion of any greater number, for the reason: These are all new arms, which have never been issued, perfectly serviceable weapons, and it is, no doubt, wise so to use up the common Enfield rifle; but you will have to begin making a new weapon as soon as you have decided on the pattern. You have not made any new rifles for the last three years, and you will have to begin gradually as soon as you have decided on the pattern. It is not, the only store of small-arms you would have would be those returned in exchange for converted Enfields. Therefore, you must make up your minds to provide a store of new weapons as soon as you decide on the pattern. I now come to the reserve force, and the recommendations of the Commissioners with regard to them. The Commissioners state that our chief army of reserve is the Militia, and that it is in that quarter that we shall eventually have to look for our reserve, and they consider it advisable to raise the Militia to its full number—that is to say, to 120,000 men. With regard to the sums provided in the Supplementary Estimates there is one great advantage—every shilling goes into the pocket of the soldier. (Hear, hear.) There are no establishments, no clerks, no anything to intercept it. But, notwithstanding this additional cost of £450,000, it is not proposed to add a single man to your army, but merely to enable you to