

the Canadian commodities which could be carried in 5 North Star aircraft might constitute a comparable gift of foodstuffs from Canada. In view of the United States gift of flour, Canada might make its contribution in canned pork and whole milk powder, say 20,000 lbs. of each. Supplies of this scale would readily be available.

Communications and Logistics Specialists for the U.N. Force

8. The Secretary-General has been made fully aware that the Government of Canada did not wish any expectation to be aroused that military assistance from Canada would be forthcoming. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General has addressed to the Canadian Government an enquiry, the text of which is attached.† It has to do with the provision of certain specialized personnel for the U.N. Force.

9. The indications are that the national contingents will be provided by Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana and possibly Guinea and Mali. These would be the troops actually engaged in maintaining order and protecting property and lives. The United Nations is faced with the problem of providing adequate communication and logistic support for the Force. The specialists required by the United Nations would be purely technical and non-combatant. They would be serving the purposes of the U.N. Force in Congo but as well they would provide the communications and logistics needs of the other United Nations agencies in the Congo operation.

10. Any request for communications and logistics specialists is outside the scope of those which the Government has announced that it was prepared to consider. Nevertheless, there will be the formidable problem of administering the U.N. Force and many of the smaller states, especially those in Africa, do not have the experience necessary for giving administrative support to a mixed Force. The language problem in the Congo also poses a serious problem, perhaps even more so than the one which faced UNEF in Gaza. In line with his enquiry to Canada, the Secretary-General is approaching Sweden and Norway about the provision of aircraft and pilots for the purpose of aerial reconnaissance and communication.

11. Any white troops involved in the role proposed for the U.N. Force in the Congo will be in a difficult situation, since it may not be easy to persuade the Congolese people that the U.N. Force [is] not another form of foreign domination. The administrative units of the Force would not be required to coerce the Congolese in any way but those whose duties brought them in contact with the people might have to protect themselves and their equipment.

12. I would welcome the views of Cabinet on the response which might be given to the two requests (paras. 4 and 5) and to the enquiry (para. 8) made by the United Nations Secretary-General.³

H.C. GREEN

³ Voir les Conclusions du Cabinet, 16 juillet 1960./See Cabinet Conclusions, July 16, 1960.