

Table 3. Old Constraints and New Opportunities in Early Warning

	Constraints	Opportunities
Information-Gathering	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - questionable accuracy and usual biases of many information sources (e.g., governments, media, NGOs) - on-site presence requires consent of host state - need to avoid undue infringement on internal affairs - threats to safety of observers (e.g., apprehension, physical security) - the "darkest" plans are kept secret - information overload - limited budgets to explore and expand new UN capabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Internet resources increase accessibility, scope and depth of information; less costly, faster retrieval - better observation technologies (e.g., aerial reconnaissance, commercial satellites with resolution better than 5 metres, ground sensors) - new and improved communications technologies (e.g., e-mail) allow more information to be sent faster and easier - computerized databases used for better information storage/management - greater willingness of intelligence agencies to share information with UN
Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - time consuming, mentally intensive - intentions are hard to guess - hazards of predictions: risk of errors (e.g., "crying wolf") and being proven wrong - need to follow leads, and to find corroborating information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - computer forecasting, graphics for visualization - better communications technologies (testing ideas, soliciting views, gaining feedback) - greater willingness of intelligence agencies to share analysis with UN
Dissemination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - risks of breaching confidentiality of sensitive information (e.g., revealing and compromising information providers) - creates pressure, often unwanted, on states to respond to new threats - may cause international embarrassment if no response is forthcoming, i.e., if the prediction becomes reality then UN is seen to have failed at response stage - if preventive action is successful, the accuracy of the predicted threat may be questioned 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - new means of dissemination to the public (e.g., through Internet) - new and expanded roles of SG at end of Cold War (e.g., good offices, multidimensional peace-keeping) brings new authority for proactive work, new response, especially possibilities for preventive deployment - Security Council response more likely than during Cold War - greater awareness of need for early warning - opportunity to set a new norm for "regular and systematic" early warning