apparent. Throughout the 1920's, inter-governmental commissions studied the engineering and economic aspects of the deep waterway.

In 1921 the International Joint Commission undertook a thorough study of the seaway project. Two engineers, one Canadian and the other American, were commissioned to report on technical problems. Their report, known as the Wooten-Bowden Report, established the feasibility of the project from an engineering standpoint. Also, the International Joint Commission, after extensive hearings, reported favourably on the seaway from an economic point of view.

A Joint Board of Engineers of six members was appointed in 1924 to review all previous studies on the seaway and to present a report to the Canadian and United States Governments. The report was presented in 1926. It confirmed the feasibility of the seaway and made cost estimates.

At the same time, two advisory committees were set up to consider the purely national aspects of the seaway, the St. Lawrence Commission in the United States, and a Canadian Advisory Committee in Canada. In 1926, the St. Lawrence Commission issued a report strongly favouring the proposed Deep Waterway. A year later the Canadian Advisory Committee reported to the Prime Minister. It supported the project, suggested continued negotiations with the United States and outlined a possible basis for a division of costs between the two countries.

Final agreement between Canada and the United States was delayed by the necessity for the Canadian Government to consult the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec on questions of Dominion-Provincial jurisdiction over power rights. A Treaty was eventually signed in 1932.

The discussion in the United States regarding ratification of the Treaty lasted for two years during which time Senate committees and special commissions debated the merits of the project. There was strong opposition from representatives of various groups in the United States who feared that they would suffer as a result of the project. Senators from States tributary to the Mississippi made a counter-proposal for deepening the Chicago drainage canal which would link Lake Michigan and the Mississippi and thus make at least part of the Great Lakes area tributary to the Gulf ports. Spokesmen from the seaboard states contended that the seaway would deal a fatal blow to ocean ports. Other opposition came from those who argued that the railways would suffer a heavy loss in traffic without any compensatory gain. Others opposed the Treaty because of the initial cost of the project.

In 1934 a vote was taken in the United States Senate and the Treaty failed to receive the two-thirds majority required for its ratification. In view of its failure to gain approval in the United States, the Treaty was not submitted for approval in the Canadian Parliament.

In both 1936 and 1938 the United States Government undertook to revive the St. Lawrence project. In the latter year the draft of a new treaty, similar to that of 1932, was submitted to Canada. No action was taken by the Canadian Government until after the outbreak of war in 1939. The value of the seaway and of its power resources was underlined by war needs. War industries required more electric power than was then available. The more than two million horse-power that might be harnessed from the International Section of the St. Lawrence directed new attention to the project. The war also emphasized the need for shipping. If it were made possible for large ocean-going vessels to navigate the waterway, shipyards on the Great Lakes could