



required. But especially if they can identify a remedy that works, the chances are that they will prescribe it. This is the essence of an enhanced UN rapid-reaction capability. It offers the United Nations a capability for effective intervention when the malady of the body politic reaches a crisis point or, better yet, when the disease is still containable. It remains up to the doctors (in this case, the Security Council) to decide how or if it should be used.

### Principles of Rapid Reaction

Several principles are emphasized in this report as the foundation for enhancing a UN rapid-reaction capability which would simultaneously decrease the UN's response time while increasing effectiveness. The principle of **reliability** or predictability stands as one of the guideposts. Equal emphasis has to be placed on the principle of **quality** rather than on quantity, aiming at doing the job well rather than on mounting a large and unwieldy multinational force. A related principle is that of **effectiveness** rather than rapidity *per se*. A hasty response, poorly executed, could well be worse medicine than nothing at all. A less rapid but more deliberate response might ultimately be far more effective. Finally, a principle that is at the root of the entire study is that of **cost-effectiveness**. It is often much better to act at an early stage, when a situation remains relatively fluid and is more susceptible to outside influence, and when the costs of intervention are fairly low, than await the consequences. The alternative, so evident in the case of Rwanda in 1994, is too often to procrastinate as the crisis emerges, but ultimately to bear much greater costs as the full bill of devastation is tallied.

These principles provide parameters for the practical, concrete steps recommended to enhance the UN's rapid-reaction capability. The study draws a distinction between "steady-state" or traditional peacekeeping operations and those which warrant rapid reaction. Both are UN "peace operations", to use the broad-brush term, and they have much in common. Improvements in one would undoubtedly benefit the effectiveness of the other. A rapid-reaction capability, however, is based upon sound contingency planning and working arrangements created in advance of crisis. It is therefore more systematic than traditional peacekeeping and requires more resources in the planning and "front end". One of the important points of the study, however, is that additional emphasis on the start-up phase of peace operations is likely to mean more efficient and cost-effective operations on the ground.

Most of the changes recommended in this report will require resources to support them. For this reason, considerable emphasis has been placed throughout the study on financial and resource issues. The Canadian Government, like many others, adheres strongly to a policy of zero growth for the UN system. For the most part, therefore, recommendations advocated in this report are based on improved management techniques and enhanced efficiencies in UN operations, on possibilities for reallocation from areas of lower priority to ones of higher priority, and on shared arrangements whereby the UN can take advantage of national capabilities at minimal cost to the Organization. Financing is a persistent problem for the UN and has reached crisis proportions, in large part because of the failure of major contributors to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. This report does not seek to add to the UN's difficulties by advocating measures which are clearly beyond