

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the past declared that they do not consider CS and other such gases and "riot control" agents, i.e. the so-called harmful chemicals, as subject to prohibition under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The United States has also left room for itself to use harmful chemicals and not only for police purposes but also even for certain military purposes.

In these conditions the Soviet Government, having carefully weighed all the circumstances connected with the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and guided by the desire to speed up the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of such weapons, has decided to agree with the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States members of the Committee on Disarmament for the inclusion in the future convention of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The Soviet Government considers that the procedures for the verification of compliance with the provision on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons should envisage the use of the verification mechanism of the convention, including on-site inspection on a voluntary basis.

In what manner might this new Soviet proposal be reflected in the text of the future convention?

First of all, its preamble should forcefully emphasize the great importance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. By prohibiting the development and production of chemical weapons and the retention of stockpiles of such weapons, the convention would in fact eliminate the whole class of chemical weapons, thus providing a serious material foundation for the Protocol.

The convention would, further, contain a provision stating that nothing in it should be interpreted as in any way limiting or diminishing the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol. In other words, the future convention would be organically incorporated into the fabric of already existing international agreements, not destroying, but on the contrary, strengthening it. Should any State not be a party to the future convention, it would in no way be released from its obligations under the Geneva Protocol. As far as the parties to the convention are concerned, they would be bound by the obligation not to use chemical weapons under both international agreements at the same time. There is nothing wrong with that.

Of course, it would be necessary to amend the wording of the main prohibition contained in the Soviet "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction". This should read as follows:

"Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never, under any circumstances, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer or use chemical weapons and undertakes to destroy or divert to permitted purposes the accumulated stocks of such weapons and to destroy or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons."

Lastly, the section of the convention devoted to verification should envisage appropriate procedures for the verification of compliance with the provision on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.