

NATO relationship and its role in defining the limits of and need for Confidence-Building Measures. For instance, if the dynamics of that relationship are largely autonomous and *intra-national*, the possibility of using CBMs to control or otherwise influence the military and political relationship will be seriously impaired. Although they might well be crucial to any understanding of Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, these notions are seldom examined and virtually never made a central feature of analysis.

### The "Type Two" Generic CBM Flaw

The second fundamental type of generic flaw in Confidence-Building thinking addresses a very different sort of problem. *Here, there is a widespread and pronounced failure to either provide or refer to a satisfactory or even plausible model of the Confidence-Building process.* Most of the Confidence-Building literature makes some sort of reference to the ways in which "confidence" can be created or fostered – in fact, there is actually a bewildering array of casual speculation on this subject – *but there is seldom any serious discussion of the dynamic psychological process or processes that would presumably "make" Confidence-Building "work".* Related to this is the fact that the CBM literature makes reference to what appear to be many categories or types of Confidence-Building Measures, each of which may very well rely upon a different "mechanism" or process and entail a different conception of Confidence-Building. It is possible that the great variety of incompatible and inconsistent *ad hoc* CBM definitions and categories effectively frustrates whatever interest there is in isolating a clear-cut model of how Confidence-Building can "work".

For all its interest in speculating about how best to formulate successful Confidence-Building Measures, the literature exhibits remarkably little analytic or theoretical interest in exploring how ordinary individuals and groups are affected positively by the particular goals of or mechanisms underlying Confidence-Building Measures. For instance, it simply isn't good enough to assume, as a sizeable proportion of the CBM literature seems to, that knowing "all about" an adversary's forces and policies will "somehow" reduce or control "unwarranted" suspicion about intentions. There is no reference to *how or why* this will transpire. There is merely the intuitive claim that knowing "more"

about a potential adversary will correct misperception and alleviate groundless mistrust. However plausible this may seem at first glance, there is no explanation of what the Confidence-Building dynamics are and how they work. Further, there is no consideration of equally plausible alternative outcomes: for instance, the possibility that "knowing more" about an adversary state will actually increase anxiety or contempt. This is a very serious analytic shortcoming.

The bulk of Confidence-Building thinking ignores a great deal of research on the operation of perception, information processing and decision-making, subjects that appear to be very important to an understanding of the Confidence-Building process(es). The failure to employ psychological and cognitive scientific findings to understand the dynamics of Confidence-Building is a crucial theoretical and empirical oversight.

In a related vein, a good deal of Confidence-Building thinking assumes that uncertainty about intentions and capabilities is necessarily a bad thing, something that needs to be corrected. The literature seldom recognizes that uncertainty can serve a constructive purpose. It also seems to be immune to the possibility that there is unavoidable or *intrinsic* uncertainty and perhaps even "unknowability" *inherent* in the WTO-NATO relationship. Without becoming involved in a philosophical discussion of how much one can actually know about a complex social phenomenon, it is worth observing that a lot of Western CBM thinking seems to be based on the questionable (and largely implicit) belief that intellectual effort and "enough" intelligence information will "correct" the uncertainty, imprecision and outright lack of specific knowledge that plague current analyses of Soviet military policy and the WTO-NATO relationship. Whether or not the nature and dynamics of that relationship can ever be understood "fully" is an open question, not a foregone conclusion. No major view of how Confidence-Building Measures work should be predicated on the assumption that one should try to achieve, through unilateral effort as well as negotiated measures, "full" or close-to-full knowledge of what the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are capable of doing, what they intend to do as well as what they believe, want, and fear. Confidence-Building efforts that revolve around the goal of "transparency"

