

word more about firing. Do not, if called upon, flinch from decidedly doing what may be your duty. It will, however, be found that much can be done by fixing bayonets and quietly advancing on a mob, as we are constantly reminded by past history that men have not yet been found who will wait with any equanimity, the steady advance of the "thin red line."

A word regarding accounts for pay against municipalities for service in aid of the civil power may also be opportune. The rates of pay are established in the Militia Act, and as the amount due for services of this nature are payable, as you are all aware, by the municipality in which the trouble occurs or is expected to occur, careful account should be kept by the adjutant and commanding officer of the names and number of men on duty and the various times at which they may go on and off duty. Pay sheets for these services should not be signed in my opinion. An ordinary account made on the usual regimental paper, certified by the paymaster, commanding officer and adjutant, is quite sufficient, and should be headed, for example, "City of Montreal, Dr. to No. 1 regiment, services in aid of Civil Power," stating days and date, commencing with the commanding officer, and ending with the rank and file, merely saying how many of each rank, and how many days, and in this connection it may also be added that, where companies perform complimentary escort duty or duties of that nature, at the request of municipal authorities under pay, simple accounts of the above nature should also be accompanied with certificates as to its correctness by the officer commanding the escort or guard. Pay sheets of course are required, as you are all aware, for all duties ordered by the Government.

A word in conclusion, more especially to the Montreal brigade: Your past record is an honorable one and forms one of the brightest jewels in Canada's history. Your country has ever received a hearty and prompt response when in need and your services have again and again been thankfully recognized by the different general officers, who have commanded you in times of difficulty. The same energy, devotion and loyalty which has characterized you, will still enable you in the future to preserve pure and unsullied the proud reputation which you now have. The future is full of signs of possible changes, may each of your regiments continue deservedly proud of your traditions and special designations, do your utmost to increase their respective strengths, and by working heartily and intelligently together, co-operate in maintaining the supremacy which may fairly be called yours as a city brigade.

THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE

General Sir George T. Chesney, K.C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., R.E., M.P., opened a discussion at the Junior Constitutional Club on Tuesday night on "The Defence of the Empire." Vice Admiral E. Field, M.P., presided, and there was a very large attendance, showing the great interest taken in the subject.

Sir George Chesney, who was warmly received, said he proposed to pass over the most important part of the defence of the Empire—the Navy. Unless the supremacy of the Navy was absolutely established, the defence of the Empire would be in a most perilous condition. If they considered the enormous interests involved in maintaining our naval supremacy, they must feel that any successful blow struck at that supremacy would produce a catastrophe which it was scarcely possible to imagine. He desired to assume that the supremacy of the Navy was established beyond question. He would merely remark that when we spoke of the supremacy of the Navy, it was rather too common a practice in the present day, both on the part of the Government and of the public, to assume that the standard which had to be attained was that of being equal to any two other navies of the world. A nation like Great Britain required such a distinct advantage in the number of her ships, in their armament, in their speed, and in every other respect as would put her supremacy in naval warfare beyond all doubt or cavil. In that sense only could we be assured of our Imperial defence. What were the other questions involved in Imperial defence? The subject naturally divided itself into two parts. First, there was the defence of the colonies. Upon this point the assumption appeared to be that our colonies in different parts of the world were liable to the contingency of being attacked in case of war by some enemy in very considerable force. He had often heard it said that Australia was liable, in the event of war, to a very serious and dangerous attack on the part of Russia. Again, he had often heard the fear expressed, not merely by men in the street, but by responsible military authorities of great distinction and weight in their profession, that India was liable to danger of a hostile fleet which might actually not only shatter or destroy what defences they found, but actually establish a permanent footing in the peninsula of India. He should like to say at once that he considered dangers of that sort chimerical. It must be remembered that an enemy who made an effort of this sort would not only have to convey a considerable body of troops and a large squadron of ships to some point on the peninsula, but they would have to face the difficulty of having no supply of coal and no coaling stations of their own, and also the great difficulty of finding a harbour of refuge in the event of their ships sustaining great damage. Everyone nowadays was aware how liable ships of war were to incur the necessity of undergoing important repairs after going into battles. The consideration of these dangers must weigh upon the brain of every foreign statesman who was considering the matter of a policy of this sort, and he would also remember that such an attempt would have the inevitable effect of materially weakening his forces in the vital point where the final struggle must be fought out in European waters. Sir George Chesney said he could not think that our colonies in the East

or elsewhere were at the present time liable to any serious attack of the sort referred to. The idea of an expeditionary force sent to conquer Australia was absurd. The extent of the country rendered such a scheme impossible and impracticable. Anything like a permanent occupation of India was also equally impossible, because there were in India the entire military resources of that Government. So also the Cape, the West Indian Islands, and the Straits Settlements must depend upon the Navy and upon their garrisons. There might be predatory attacks from isolated men-of-war or small squadron detached for the purpose, which might seek to harass us, to bombard some of our seaport towns, possibly levy blackmail; and the remedy for that was to provide the harbours with sufficient protection in the way of batteries in order to render such an attack impossible. That precaution had, he believed, been taken in Australia, at the Cape, at Halifax, and elsewhere, and had certainly been taken in India almost to the point of over-production. Certainly there the protections of Bombay, Calcutta, Rangoon, and Aden fulfilled the first condition of fortifications, for they were so strong that it was almost certain they would never be attacked, and that was the aim and object of the engineer in carrying out fortifications. A very large expenditure was sanctioned during the five years he was in charge of the War Department of India, and he believed that it was fully justified, for we had now made all our large harbours perfectly safe from attack. Generally speaking, and always assuming that the supremacy of our Navy was granted, he regarded our Colonial Empire as in a position of security. Its great distance and its size were in themselves potential safeguards. Five millions of free Britons could not be maintained, be subdued by, an expeditionary force. He had, however, left out one important exception. He referred to Canada, where the conditions were altogether different from those which obtained in Australia and at the Cape. In Canada there was an enormous line of frontier faced by another great independent Empire, and the serious question had to be considered how a defence could be maintained along that great line in the event—which God forbid should ever occur—of our being engaged in hostilities with the United States. No doubt in the event of such a sort of quarrel as took place not many years ago, when a strong feeling was got up in certain parts of America in favour of the annexation of Canada, and when small isolated bodies made irruptions into that country, the Canadians would be able, as they were then, to give a very good account of themselves. It was impossible, however, to doubt if some great question or quarrel arose involving the interests of the people of the United States, and if the feelings of that people were so roused that they should determine to carry out that quarrel to the bitter end, that the position could be anything but an extremely serious one. The people of the United States were capable in times of great emergency of great things, and if