

Commission could manage. The then  
eral Minister of Energy, Mines and  
resources, Donald Macdonald, and On-  
rio Energy Minister Darcy McKeough  
ade a joint visit in February that in-  
uded a call on Prime Minister Heath the  
after he called the election he was to  
e. They also held a joint news confer-  
er 20 ce at Canada House. Gillespie pursued  
ied the CANDU cause further with British  
nisters of the new Labour Government  
ing a visit in April. A three-man team  
m. It British experts visited Pickering in  
was "in February and on April 8 Fishlock reported  
eration *The Financial Times* that their report  
of hee the British Cabinet could "wreck" the  
es of entral Generating Board's chances of  
media tting approval to buy American reactors.

### crucial momentum

While my personal judgment, the crucial mo-  
mentum of the CANDU campaign was  
almost dealt by the first Gray news conference.  
I learnt that the news stories about this  
Canadian initiative had won wide  
attention among British Parliamentarians.  
at Canhere was evidence that this had led a  
ouse of Commons subcommittee to re-  
ppaign on hearings on nuclear energy. Conser-  
ned of tive Party headquarters asked Scientific  
e *Financial* counsellor Greenwood to arrange a back-  
der a ound briefing for Conservative back-  
bid to enchers, which he did. Atomic Energy  
U.K. officials from Canada attended. Questions  
adian ere asked in the Commons about the pos-  
bid to ibility of going ahead with heavy-water  
of the factors on a joint Anglo-Canadian basis,  
n collab the course of which Canada's nuclear-  
reactors energy program was described as "ex-  
Gray's nemely impressive".

The respected *New Scientist* maga-  
nd briefe, in a full-page report on the Gray news  
als for onference, said: "CANDU technology is  
and Clearer to British experience than is LWR  
technol(American) technology, and techniques  
er" ran r (Britain's) SGHWR are similar to  
e *Guard* those needed for CANDU. This should  
ported take CANDU easier for British engineers  
r colum take up." The report was critical of the  
option' prospective decision to buy American and  
rged the Commons subcommittee to dig  
eeply, which the subcommittee seemed  
ready to have decided to do. As an in-  
teresting spinoff, Gray's news conference  
roduced a front-page story in the prestige  
ster. He Paris daily *Le Monde*. The Canadian em-  
assy there reported to Ottawa that it  
of Scot considered that this "constitutes a break-  
possibilit through in publicity for CANDU in  
e next nance".

By the end of November, a decision  
had been taken to run an advertising cam-  
aign to maintain the public diplomacy  
momentum. Warren's only stipulations

were that it must not try to capitalize on  
then-current worries about an energy  
crisis in Britain and should not add to the  
political problems of the British Govern-  
ment on energy issues. Among other reasons  
given for the campaign was that it would  
increase pressure in Britain for full con-  
sideration of Canadian nuclear experience  
and would create a climate more re-  
ceptive to a decision to opt for CANDU  
or a related system than if the general  
public were largely unaware of CANDU's  
existence.

On the advice of a London advertising  
agency, a quarter-page ad was carried in  
*The Financial Times* on January 11, 1974,  
*The Sunday Times* on January 13 and  
*The Daily Telegraph* on January 15. The  
same ad was run on a full page in *The  
Economist* of January 19. The emphasis  
was strictly positive and self-confident.  
Under the headline "CANDU - The  
Canadian Alternative", the opening para-  
graph said: "There is another commer-  
cially proven North American source of  
nuclear power - the Canadian CANDU  
reactor. Only modesty keeps us from say-  
ing CANDU is the best reactor in any  
market today. But it cannot be denied  
that its performance record shows there  
is no more productive, more reliable or  
safer reactor in commercial use." It con-  
cluded: "Atomic Energy of Canada Limi-  
ted traces its nuclear research back to  
partnership with Britain at the start of the  
nuclear age three decades ago." And it  
asked: "Is it not a good time for the part-  
nership to be renewed?"

The ad series evoked further rounds  
of letters to the editor. A copy of it was  
sent to all 635 British Members of Parlia-  
ment. One letter in *The Financial Times*,  
under the heading "Candu can do it",  
asked why it had been necessary for Can-  
ada to put its CANDU case in an ad. Why  
wasn't the Central Generating Board  
telling Britons why CANDU was not its  
choice? A letter appeared in *The Guardian*  
under a four-column heading: "What  
about Canada's reactors?" Following the  
change of British Governments in February  
1974, a nine-member delegation of MPs,  
representing all parties, visited Pickering  
to look at the CANDU for themselves. By  
all accounts they were favourably im-  
pressed. Similar ads were later run in *The  
Times* (March 13) and *New Scientist*. The  
one in *New Scientist* was later used as  
an illustration on the British Broadcas-  
ting Corporation public affairs television  
program "Panorama", which mentioned  
CANDU in a study of the British reactor  
decision. A letter to the editor about the  
advertising caught the attention of a BBC

*Advertisements  
strictly positive  
and self-confident*

*Letters to editors  
resulted from  
series of ads*