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ment until the fighting spirit has been eliminated or greatly modified. The naked will to conquer is not infrequently a more stubborn obstacle to peace than the economic factors which are the ostensible causes of conflict.

In the foregoing I have assumed that a permanent settlement presupposes the discovery and demonstration of an adequate ground of common interest, and the question that oppresses me in regard to the international situation is this:

Is there an adequate ground of common interest? If there is, can we demonstrate it to the combatants in a convincing manner?

The question oppresses me, because the answer to it seems to be taken for granted by some of the combatants. Their national interest is bound up with territorial expansion, and this idea seems to me to create an interest that is impossible to reconcile with other interests, to raise an obstacle against world peace which is insurmountable. A nation can only extend its boundaries by taking the territory of some other nation. The dispossessed nation can only submit by being willing to commit suicide, and, unless it is willing, it may logically enough argue that it is better to die fighting than to accept extinction without striking a blow. Clearly, therefore, territorial expansion is irreconcilable with other factors in the problem and, unless it can be eliminated, presents a permanent barrier to the establishment of an adequate ground of common interest. But is territorial expansion, in fact, a real national interest? Is a nation greater because it is bigger? Is extension in itself desirable and, if so, to whom?

If the American conception of government is right we can answer these questions emphatically in the negative. If the well-being of the individuals composing the nation is the criterion of success in government then we may be sure it has no necessary relation to bigness. Bigness may be, in fact, distinctly disadvantageous to good government. Mere magnitude may add to the complexity and difficulty of government without in the least adding to the elements that make for efficiency. If you want proof look at our big cities. Or ask yourself whether you would prefer to live in a small country like Holland or Switzerland or in a big one like Russia. If you are an American consider whether it would help you personally if our government were to make itself bigger by taking on the burden of Mexico. Or if a German workman ask yourself whether it would add to your wages, earning power, or comfort in life, if your government were to extend itself over, say, the Balkan states.

These questions answer themselves. It is scarcely conceivable that an individual can gain anything that counts in

the practical values of life by merely extending the boundaries of his government; unless, indeed, it be increased security against predatory neighbors. And against these it is part of our present problem to provide insurance. The case against mere bigness as a national end was summed up by Froude in these words: "It is not progress for two people to starve to death where one formerly lived in plenty."

Who then profits by an expanding empire? No one, unless it be the ruler or the ruling class. These may experience an inflation of personality, a greater sense of power, of glory, of fame; and in so far as they think they own the country, they may feel themselves richer in their increased possessions much as a farmer does who adds another quarter section to his farm. The humble citizen may be made to feel a little of the reflected glory, but hardly enough to make him want to shed his blood for it, or to have it stand in the way of peace.

But the humble citizen is shedding his blood, because he does not know. He is misled. He is the victim of a patriotic fallacy. He identifies his country's greatness with might of arms, and, too, often, with territorial aggrandizement. He has inherited a state of mind, and in it is imbedded this false idea. To change this state of mind is the crux of the whole problem. Without it an adequate ground of common interest cannot be established, and the problem of world peace will remain insoluble.

There are able publicists who claim that this state of mind cannot be changed without a decisive and complete military victory, that only by a crushing of the opposing nation can the desired psychological point of view be induced. These are hardly likely to heed the voice of the peaceful mediator. I would not dogmatize on this point, not being an authority on the psychology of nations, but I have my serious doubts about a fallacy being killed by a bullet. If for a time crushed, a false idea, like a true one, will tend to rise again reinvigorated by its temporary suppression.

I confess my art as a mediator fails me in proposing a remedy for a national state of mind. I am certain, however, that it is in this direction that the world's peace must be sought. I am certain, too, that it cannot be fought out; it must be thought out; and that friendly measures are more likely to be successful than hostile ones. And finally, I think it possible that the strain of struggle may have modified the psychology of the nations at war so that the rigid thought forms of the past may have become so far softened that even now they may be ready to listen to the voice of sanity, of truth, and of peace. If so, they are ready for mediation, perhaps even for arbitration. If not, no peace can be more than a truce.

