

liked to have informed you of our intentions before we took action, but, as you will realise, events have moved so fast that it was quite impossible to delay.

The policy of my Government throughout has been to isolate the Congo situation and to act in such a way as to prevent the direct intervention of any of the Great Powers in the African Continent.

As you know, my policy has always been that at all costs Africa must not be involved in the Cold War.

When emerging countries such as the Republic of Congo are threatened by interests outside the African Continent, they must naturally look for help from whatever source they can obtain it. The object of my Government has always been to reassure Congo that this help would be forthcoming from within the African Continent and that it was therefore unnecessary to seek help from outside. Ghana's policy throughout has been determined on this basis.

Generally speaking, I believe that initiative in African affairs should come from the Independent African States. While help from any outside source is always of value, the value of this help is much reduced if it is not channelled through an African medium. The African Continent is automatically involved in Great Power disputes if one country assists another on the basis of any alliance or organisation primarily designed for other parts of the world. For example, in my view it would be most undesirable if any Great Power allowed its policy in Africa to be dictated in the interests of any defence or other agreement which it had with other powers in relation to any other part of the world.

A view widely held in Congolese political circles has been that those powers who are associated in N.A.T.O. would, because of their military commitments to Belgium, be unable to take an impartial view of the events in Congo. Some colour, I feel, has been given to this view by the failure on a number of occasions of various N.A.T.O. Powers to support the Security Council resolutions. The suspicion has thus grown that because of consideration of European political issues, the Western Powers were unwilling for the United Nations to take really effective action in Congo.

In my view the most important issue in Congo affairs is the position of Katanga. I do not think that there can be any doubt at all that the so-called Katanga régime is a pure puppet régime of the Belgians. Mr. Tshombe and his party, the Conakat Bureau, are well known to us in Accra. He and members of his party have attended conferences here and we have on many occasions discussed African policy. What Mr. Tshombe is saying to-day bears no resemblance to what he used to say in Accra. I can only attribute the sudden change to the fact that he has had to accommodate his policy to the policy of the power whose forces are to-day occupying Katanga.

I feel, however, that the most recent resolution of the Security Council¹⁰ shows that with the exception of France and Italy, all those powers associated with N.A.T.O. are prepared to take a broader and a more general view of the situation. Ghana will certainly support to the full the Security Council resolutions.

In regard to the wider issues, I should like to make these comments:

I think that all Independent African States are disturbed by the revelations now being made by Belgium as to the extent of N.A.T.O. participation in the Belgian Congo bases and particularly in their participation in the Katanga base which had been established at Kamina.

¹⁰ C'était la résolution du 9 août. Voir *Documents on International Affairs 1960* (London: Oxford University Press/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1964), pp. 285-86.

This was the resolution of August 9. See *Documents on International Affairs 1960* (London: Oxford University Press/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1964), pp. 285-86.