

and difficulties would constantly arise between the different communities that would exist in North America. By union, on the other hand, the United States have been able to rise to a leading position not only as a commercial but a military power. The authors of *The Federalist* saw the results of the doctrine of Isolation, or Disintegration more properly, and opposed it by arguments which are just as conclusive in favor of the contemplated union of British America. For instance, the following argument, intended to show that the safety of the American people would be best secured by union, is quite applicable to the circumstances of British America :

"Our government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precaution to each. In the formation of treaties it will regard the interests of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defence of any particular point, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments, or separate Confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent bodies. What would the militia of Britain be, if the English militia obeyed the Government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the Government of Scotland, if the Welsh militia obeyed the Government of Wales? Suppose an invasion: would those three Governments (if they agree at all) be able with all their respective forces to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single Government of Great Britain would? We have heard much of the fleets of England, and the time may come, if we are alive, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national government had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen—if one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their powers and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet—let Wales have its navigation and fleet—let Scotland have its navigation and fleet—let Ireland have its navigation and fleet—let three or four of the constituent parts of the British Empire be under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defence.

It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert—an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army: and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the directions of the central authority. . . . Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the public defence as that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided; which as the centre of information will best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten: as the representative of the whole will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of every part; which, from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and which, by the extension of its authority throughout the States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures, by which the common security is to be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the Federal Government the care of the general defence, and leaving in the State governments the effective powers, by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want of co-operation the infallible consequence of such a system?"

In the present position of the colonies, they are unable to take those measures for the public defence which would best ensure them from danger of invasion. No combination exists between them: each province has its own internal organization for defence. It would be in the power of any colonial legislature to-morrow to refuse to vote the moneys requisite for defensive purposes. We believe there is now far too much patriotism in these provinces to allow them to imitate the example of the old colonists, in the first half of last century. Yet it would be possible for unscrupulous politicians by raising false issues and otherwise working upon the feelings of the masses, to bring about similar results. The policy of Isolation tends to intense selfishness; it curbs the generous impulses of our nature, wraps us up in ourselves, prevents us looking beyond our own borders; in short, it is antagonistic to the growth of all those feelings and sympathies which would, in the time of war, cause us to rise as one people in the defence of our common rights and privileges. In a word, Isolation is opposed to that spirit of nationality which has in all times preserved many countries from the grasp of tyranny and ambition.

That British statesmen believe that Union will be the means of increasing the ability of the provinces to defend themselves when the hour