

tot's remark that in Tinné a sound often means both a notion and its opposite; that, for instance, the same word may express good and bad, and another both high and low. To use M. Petitot's own words, "a certain number of consonants have the power of expressing a given order of ideas or things, and also the contradictory of this order." In Tinné, a great many words for opposite ideas are the same or nearly the same, derived from the same significant elements. Thus, *son* good, *sona* bad; *tezo*, sweet, *texon* bitter; *ya* immense, *ya* very small; *inla* one time, *inlasin* every time; and so on.

This union of opposite significations reappears in the ultimate radicals of the Cree language. These, says Mr. Howse,* whose *Grammar* I again quote, express *Being* in its positive and negative modes; "These opposite modes are expressed by modifications of the same element, furnishing two classes of terms widely different from each other in signification." In Cree the leading substantive radical is *eth*, which originally meant both Being and Not-Being. In the present language *eth* remains as the current positive, *ith* as the current privative. *It* means within, *ut* without; and like parallelisms run through many expressions, indicating that numerous series of opposite ideas are developments from the same original sounds.

I have found a number of such examples in the Nahuatl of Mexico, and I am persuaded that they are very usual in American tongues. Dr. Carl Abel has pointed out many in the ancient Coptic, and I doubt not they were characteristic of all primitive speech.

To explain their presence we must reflect on the nature of the human mind, and the ascertained laws of thought. One of these fundamental and necessary laws of thought, that usually called the second, was expressed by the older logicians in the phrase *Omni's determinatio est negatio*, and by their modern followers in the formula, "*A* is not *not-A*;" in other words, a quality, an idea, and element of knowledge, can rise into cognition only by being limited by that which it is not. That by which it is limited is known in logic as its privative. In a work published some years ago I pointed out that this privative is not an independent thought, as some have maintained, but that the positive and its privative are really two

* See Howse, *Grammar of the Cree Language*, pp. 16, 134, 135, 169, etc.

I may quote a true probably of modifications of vocal writing, seem to Indian language." vocal inflection, culty or not at all ently significant. ed that in Tinné in his Grammar pause may com- in another class; n of the tenses.* Montoya illus- at Peru ou, Peter meaning. In the the only distinc- ticiples. In the s from their sin- son accustomed naturally at a is in relating his gue also charac- the region where n his hand, and understand one ke Spanish, and e had them per- was understood. ; but what was a single word l uing to that of phenomenon in otting M. Peti- de Montoya, p. 100.