

could not but see the impropriety, according to all the rules of war and of common sense, of effectuating a descent, from which no good could be hoped for the success of the main of the enterprize, the attack upon Rochefort? Could any thing counterbalance the moral assurance of being cut off division by division, which must have been the case, unless the French could be suspected of falling off, on such a tempting occasion, from their usual alertness, or have only suspended its exertion, in order to draw us more compleatly into the snare?

“ It does not appear, (says the Report),
 “ that there were any sufficient reasons to
 “ induce the council of war to believe that
 “ Rochefort was so far changed, in respect
 “ of its strength or posture of defence,
 “ since the expedition was first resolved on
 “ in England, as to prevent all attempts of
 “ an attack upon the place, in order to
 “ burn and destroy the docks, magazines,
 “ arsenals, and shipping, in obedience,
 “ &c.”

To all this the commanders might cheerfully subscribe, since it does honor both to their sense and obedience. They were sent surely on the plan of a surprize, or coup-de-main. Nothing can be plainer than their instructions on this head: but that case of
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