

recognized in this Assembly that it would be much too dangerous to allow it to fail. It is our hope and expectation that no country, large or small, would withhold co-operation either in making contributions, if requested, to this International Force, or in letting it operate in its own territory, for the alternative would be to risk a local conflict developing into something more general and dangerous.

If our experiment works - and that is, of course, the first prerequisite - it may be that the United Nations might usefully consider some means of having units of armed forces of the smaller countries made available at short notice for such supervisory duties, on the call of the United Nations. The United Nations might also think of a permanent organization available to the appropriate United Nations authority to provide the necessary central machinery which would organize their contributions and put their forces effectively into operation when the need arises. I want to make it clear that I am not hinting necessarily that the present United Nations Emergency Force be made into a permanent force, although we should build upon the experience of that experiment. Shall we go back once again to the situation in which the United Nations found itself both in June 1950 and in November 1956, when everything had to be improvised, when there were no units, and no financial and administrative procedures to which the Secretary General could turn in the task given him by the Assembly of putting a United Nations force into a dangerous and delicate situation.

If the Secretary General had had such an organization available in September and ready for use in our time of emergency many of the difficulties and delays which arose might have been avoided. The Secretary General's truly amazing energy and devotion brought something together out of nothing with remarkable speed. But we have not the right, in all prudence, to expect the same miracle to be accomplished next time with the same success and speed. And next time - if there is one - we would wish to make sure that a cease-fire would be sustained and the United Nations forces would arrive in time, so that there would be no danger of a local outbreak of fighting growing into a general conflagration. That is the nub of our problem for the future. If we do not begin to think about a longer term solution of this problem, we may miss the psychological moment when national governments may perhaps be prepared, under the impact of recent events, to commit themselves to such procedures in advance for the sake of increasing the collective authority of our organization.

Even while considering how we can best organize collective security through the United Nations within the limitations of our situation, we must not neglect, Mr. President, the parallel efforts which have to be made to reach solutions of the points of most acute friction and danger. We must not imagine, needless to say, that the creation of this or any other international force will solve the acute problems we face. Such

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