

commitments made there, but the reality is different.²³ Consequently, the public may be disillusioned when they discover a more sober truth, as many did when they found Canada outside the "Contact Group" directing NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia. *Joint*

we have to have a strategy to address this
A forum on a national strategy to guide coalition policy ought to address three items concerning public support. First, to redress any public misunderstanding of Canada's capabilities to act through coalitions, politicians should forthrightly explain the state of Canadian diplomatic and military assets and the situation of prominent Canadian-based NGOs. Second, leaders should organize a public campaign to describe to citizens the complexities of the "new world disorder" and the consequences it brings to Canadian foreign policy. Third, politicians should describe the opportunities available for Canadians to take the lead in some types of multinational coalitions and the costs such efforts might entail. The public might then appreciate that while Canada could build coalitions of the willing around soft assets where risks are low – as in specific arms control areas and international judicial matters -- they might also lower their expectations of Canada's ability to act in coalitions where hard assets are needed and high risks are anticipated. Alternatively, Canadians might decide to assemble the means needed to match the vision they have of Canada in the world.

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A Framework Document for Acting Through Coalitions An officials' forum on a national strategy for acting through coalitions ought to produce for political leaders a framework document to govern *Coalitions and Canadian Foreign Policy*. This document (perhaps even a Cabinet "white paper" given the continuing emergency) ought to provide a comprehensive, coherent, and authorized statement of intent and an indication of the resources needed to achieve it. It should be written to inform the public, to guide and control the policy discretion of officials and Canadian Forces officers, and to bring order to the ends and means of foreign and defence policies.

Although Canada could sit still, leaving international responsibilities to others, it would then risk sliding out of sight in international affairs. Canadians would then have to accept that other states, willing to take the risks and pay the price, would set the agenda and receive any resulting benefits. Canadians would also have to set aside a legacy of sacrifice and compassion and a willingness to champion values that have defined Canada at home and abroad. On the other hand, an ambitious document might introduce Canadians to a road towards a new horizon and to a national policy that would place Canada in the vanguard of the gathering movement toward international peace and security through multinational coalitions.

But a crusade, even if led by a new generation of political leaders, fuelled only on rhetoric will go nowhere. Canada, to regain the prominence it once held in the international community, ought to heed the words and courage of the man who did so much to create it long ago. Lester Pearson believed "that the maintenance of an overwhelming superiority of force on the side of peace is the best guarantee today of the maintenance of peace" and Canadians were willing then to back his words with their own efforts. Few could credibly argue that Canadians today are less willing to back sound policies aimed at bringing greater peace and security to the international community.

²³. Douglas Bland, *Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces*, op. cit. pp. 34-35.