

its ability to hit "high-value" targets in China is far more circumscribed.

Furthermore, and in contrast to the NSAB model, a deterrent composed exclusively of manned bombers and missiles is likely to necessitate greater concern with measures associated with force survivability. Indeed, a wholly land-based deterrent would be more vulnerable to both conventional and nuclear attack. And while the prospect of an enemy launching a fully disarming pre-emptive strike would be improbable, planners would undoubtedly wish to insure a level of force survivability sufficient to eliminate any illusions to the contrary. In fact, in this area, many of the economic costs associated with the NSAB version of deterrence would attend (and perhaps even exceed) a scaled-down variant.

Overall, military allegiance to the strategy chosen should pose few major difficulties. Traditionally the purview of the Indian scientific community and select politicians, inter-service interests and stakes in nuclear operations have generally been low. With few bureaucratic axes to grind, the military is likely to comply with any and all lines of responsibility set down by India's civilian leadership.

In fact, past military practice appears quite conducive to the dictates of no-first-use doctrine. The IAF has long planned for the conduct of a protracted conventional war in which nuclear arms would serve as a shield against first use by an aggressor.

Worrisome however, is a tradition of near-total exclusion of the military from nuclear planning. Indeed, failure to institutionalize effective service participation in all aspects of the nuclear doctrine could ultimately place the deterrent credibility of the arsenal at serious risk.<sup>24</sup> As such, major efforts would be needed to insure military competence in areas such as strategic and tactical warning, and in developing inter-service coordination for nuclear operations. Service involvement would be equally essential for insuring the safety and security of the weapons themselves.

Beyond this, careful thought would be required for insuring clear lines of authority in the event of political succession. Given India's long tradition of weak coalition governments, developing such provisions could be difficult.

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in the absence of a careful analysis of its values and interests. Clearly however, the ability to inflict "assured destruction", ie. one-third of a nation's population and two-thirds of its industrial capacity need not represent the sole benchmark and is increasingly viewed in many quarters as excessive.

<sup>24</sup> For elaboration, see Neil Joeck, *Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia* (Adelphi Paper No. 312) (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 60-63.