

c) *The Problem of Asymmetrical Constraints*

A willingness to accept constraints on force and manpower deployments may be strongly influenced by the degree to which the proposed constraints will operate equally on both sides. In the Sinai experience, with only two principal parties, this problem was managed effectively in two ways. First, the US provided Egypt with its own national surveillance station identical to the one Israel operated, thereby providing the disadvantaged party with a parallel capability. Second, by agreeing to interpose US civilians in the early warning system separating the two sides, the US provided Israel with a measure of tangible reassurance as it began to exchange territory for peace.

A cursory glance at the map of Europe suggests the presence of significant asymmetries which would appear to favour the military position of the Warsaw Pact nations. For example:


- The distance between the western border of the Soviet Union and the central demarcation line through Germany is between 600 and 700 km; the distance from this central line to the US — spanning the Atlantic Ocean — is some 5 000 km.
- The Warsaw Pact, unlike NATO forces, enjoys the military use of a wide unconfined geographical area for deployments and movements under its central unified command.
- The continued absence of France from the NATO integrated military structure limits the NATO command area along the northern and eastern borders of France.
- Soviet territory is not within direct operational range of NATO forces deployed in Western Germany, while Soviet and other Pact forces in Central Europe are close to the entire territory of the Federal Republic.

Restrictions on Western troop movements within the geographic setting described above could complicate NATO's strategy of forward

defence and necessitate an increase in defence integration and mobility. Under any proposed disengagement scheme, NATO forces would need to retain the capacity to promptly deter any massive reintroduction of Pact forces into the limited-forces zones as well as safeguard against small incremental violations. By contrast, the Warsaw Pact is in a far more advantageous geographic position to accept troop restrictions since such restraints would do little to jeopardize overall defence preparedness.⁵⁴

d) *Impediments to Identifying a Credible Third Party for Verification*

The Sinai experience clearly showed that a credible third party with sufficient political clout, technical expertise and economic resources to commit to a peace-building process can help ensure the successful implementation and operation of a verification system. However, before attempting to determine how third-party-assisted verification might be applied in Europe, it is worth highlighting some of the unique aspects of the Sinai experience in this regard. First, in the aftermath of bitter hostilities, Egypt and Israel urgently needed the US to help them "save face", in effect, by having an agreement



⁵⁴ For a discussion of Warsaw Pact strategic advantages in Central Europe see Lothar Ruehl, "MBFR: Lessons and Problems", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 176 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 4. See also John Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 131.

