

Gorbachev's Murmansk proposals of last October in a speech by External Affairs Minister Clark in Tromsø, Norway, 9 December. While welcoming the Soviet leader's offer of non-military cooperation in the North, Mr. Clark noted that Canada had "serious reservations" about the proposals for a Northern European nuclear weapon-free zone; a limitation of military activity in the waters of the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland Seas; and a ban on naval activity in mutually agreed zones. In Clark's words: "Declaring the Arctic a nuclear weapon-free zone or restricting certain naval movements there would do nothing to reduce the threat from [nuclear] weapons. It would be destabilizing for other regions."

While appearing to rule out any so-called "Arctic-specific" arms control measures, he did not specifically address the issue – also raised in Gorbachev's Murmansk speech – of naval confidence-building measures.

Early in the New Year the USSR stepped up its diplomatic campaign on behalf of the "Murmansk programme." In Stockholm on 10 January, Soviet Premier Ryzhkov announced that the USSR intended, as a "unilateral confidence-building measure," to invite observers from the Nordic countries to a Soviet naval exercise in 1988, and was "counting on reciprocity." He proposed that the question of arms control in the North be examined at the second stage of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (the first stage of which concluded in Stockholm in 1986); that Nordic neutrals Sweden and Finland be invited to participate in the envisaged Warsaw Pact-NATO consultations; and that, in response to "the wishes expressed by the Northerners," the Barents Sea could be included within the "zone of confidence-building measures."

The Murmansk programme was further elaborated in an interview with Maj.-General Yuriy Lebedev published in the 13 January issue of *Moscow News*, as well as a second speech by Ryzhkov in Oslo the following day. Among the measures proposed were: (1) limiting

"large-scale" naval and air exercises in the "zone of confidence-building measures" to one every two years; (2) banning anti-submarine warfare activities in "agreed-upon regions" of the North and West Atlantic, for the

neighbouring countries" before formulating a position. However, various unnamed military analysts and diplomats in the Nordic countries predicted that NATO would find the proposals unacceptable. One Norwegian defence ministry

Soviet scientists will then be in place at each other's test sites to conduct the experiment.

### European Arms Control

■ In the aftermath of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty's elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles, attention has turned to short-range nuclear forces (SNF) in Europe – those with a range of under 500 kilometers. As feared by many in NATO, the East has called for a total ban on short-range forces. First, East German leader Erich Honecker, in a 16 December letter to West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl, stated that if NATO renounced the modernization of its SNF, "steps could be taken on the basis of equality and equal security to remove imbalances through disarmament leading to further zero solutions." Then, on a visit to Bonn 18 January, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze called for a "complete removal of tactical nuclear weapons." West German Foreign Minister Genscher declared that his government would "continue to work for a mandate for" negotiations on "land-based nuclear short-range missiles," with the goal of "significant and verifiable reduction of these nuclear systems to equal upper limits." Other NATO governments oppose this emphasis on the limitation of SNF, arguing that they are necessary to counter a perceived Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces, and should not be limited until the conventional imbalance has been corrected. NATO spokesmen did, however, welcome Shevardnadze's announcement in Bonn that SNF could be discussed separately from conventional arms – a shift away from earlier Soviet insistence that the two be negotiated together.

On 19 February, after meeting President Reagan in Washington, Chancellor Kohl announced agreement to defer the modernization decision while supporting an "overall concept" for arms control including the limitation, but not elimination, of SNF. □

- R O N P U R V E R

### Early Warning

April	Nuclear Planning Group meeting of NATO defence ministers, Copenhagen
Late May/early June	fourth Reagan-Gorbachev summit, Moscow
May 2-20	UN Disarmament Commission, annual session, New York
May 31-June 25	Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSOD III), New York
June 9-10	North Atlantic Council meeting of NATO foreign ministers, Madrid

USSR and US respectively; (3) bilateral and multilateral agreements to prevent "incidents at sea"; (4) a ban on naval exercises on main shipping routes and in regions of "intensive seasonal fishing"; (5) prohibiting the "concentration of naval groupings in international straits or the approaches to them," including the Baltic straits, the Denmark Strait, the English Channel, and the "Iceland-Faeroe Islands-Scandinavia region"; (6) limiting the "maximum parameters of these groupings in terms of the number and classes of ships and other characteristics"; and (7) northern European confidence-building measures "at a lower level" than those of the 1976 Stockholm Agreement, "including elements of 'nonaggressive defense,' a sharp limitation of the scale of military exercises and of other activity in the agreed regions." In Oslo, Ryzhkov also proposed an early meeting of Warsaw Pact and NATO military experts to prepare for the joint consultations on naval confidence-building measures.

The early reaction from Ryzhkov's Scandinavian hosts was positive but cautious. Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson promised to "carefully study" the Soviet proposals and "where applicable, consult and confer with our Nordic

official said they were "completely in conflict with most NATO nations' views on freedom of the seas, and could threaten the alliance's internal lines of communication."

### Nuclear Testing

■ Following an agreement reached at the US-Soviet talks on nuclear testing in Geneva in November and signed at the Washington summit, a team of twenty American experts made the first official US visit to the Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk from 10 to 15 January. A US official later described the visit as "mind-boggling," noting that the Soviet hosts had been "exceptionally forthcoming." Two weeks later, a group of Soviet experts made a reciprocal visit to the US test site in Nevada.

The purpose of the exchange was to familiarize each side with the other's nuclear testing facilities and procedures, in preparation for a "joint verification experiment" in which each will be allowed to observe and measure one or two nuclear explosions by the other. The experiment is intended to pave the way for US Senate ratification of the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, by resolving a debate over appropriate verification techniques. At the end of the Soviet visit to Nevada, the leaders of the two teams expressed hope that the tests would be conducted in May. Forty-member teams of US and