

Personally I found that in their camps and military garrisons the bugling was almost incessant, and I notice that in Mr. Curzon's latest book on "The Far East" he refers to the "perpetual bugle note" in the streets of Tokio; and that distinguished authority, Mr. Henry Norman, in his admirable book on "The Real Japan," in speaking of Japanese garrisons, remarks:—"Tokio is almost as full of soldiers as Metz, and there is hardly five minutes in the day when you cannot hear a bugle blown somewhere."

I can only apologise if, in my description of the Japanese forces, I can find nothing humorous to set before you. The Japanese army is like any other first-class modern army, and indeed is so similar in appearance that "a Japanese column might march through any German city without attracting special attention as foreign troops."

Japan and China have long been enemies, for centuries I may say, and the bitterness of feeling between the two countries has become almost a religion in its intensity. Ever since Japan adopted western civilization in 1868, it has been the ambition of her war party to make China the first mark of their newly-found weapons. So intense was this feeling that one of the principal causes of the Japanese civil-war in 1877 was the refusal of the government of the day to declare war against the hereditary foe.

It must not be supposed from this that the government was desirous of cultivating friendly relations with China. It was only anxious not to deliver the blow prematurely, and to wait till the Japanese army should be thoroughly remodelled and equipped according to the latest western pattern.

As soon as this work was accomplished, I do not say that war was deliberately provoked, but an excuse for it most conveniently arrived. In the spring of 1894 one of the perennial rebellions against the government broke out in the south of Korea. Being totally unable to deal with any emergency himself, the King of Korea appealed to his suzerain, the Emperor of China, for assistance.

The latter replied by sending a force of two thousand Chinese troops, of the usual Chinese pattern, under a General Yeh (also of the usual pattern), by sea to Asan, which is about 40 miles to the south of Seoul, the capital of Korea. This was early in June.

According to the China Japan Treaty of 1885, each country had equal rights of interference in Korea in case of disturbances; and Japan promptly replied to the Chinese move by dispatching 5000 men (the 9th Brigade of the 4th Division), under General Oshima, to Chemulpo, to watch Japanese interests.

In this connection it is well to observe that China had but little interest in Korea, beyond the maintenance of her shadowy, but arrogant suzerainty; whereas the Japanese had enormous commercial interests at stake, and large and prosperous colonies at Gensan, Fusan, and Chemulpo.

This Japanese force was rapidly and steadily augmented to about 7,000 men, and occupied Seoul, the capital, without serious opposition.

By this move they were at once in possession, so to speak, of the Korean government, and had also strategically interposed between the Chinese force at Asan and the Chinese main army in Manchuria.

The Chinese now attempted to reinforce the Asan detachment by sea in face of Japanese opposition, with the well-known result that the transport "Kow-Shing" was sunk, with over 1000 Chinese troops on board, by the Japanese cruiser "Naniwa-Kan," on July 25. A

great attempt was made to construe this incident into an outrage on the British flag; but there is no doubt that the Japanese were perfectly justified in their action. The "Kow-Shing," although a British vessel, had been chartered as a war transport by the Chinese government, and as such was entitled to no immunity from capture or destruction.

The Chinese at Asan now being cut off sea-ward by the Japanese fleet, were completely isolated, and their only line of escape was to the north-east, towards Manchuria, round the Japanese at Seoul. In attempting this movement, which General Oshima received orders to prevent, there were several small skirmishes, till on July 29 the Japanese, with 3,000 men attacked and defeated the Chinese at Suwon or Seikwan, driving them to Yo-ju with a loss of 300. The Japanese then pushed on and occupied Asan. The remnant of the Chinese force succeeded in escaping with the help of the Koreans, and after a long detour rejoined the Chinese main army at Ping-Yang.

During all this period war had not been formally declared, but this is no unusual occurrence. History shows that in the majority of cases hostilities have preceded the declaration of war.

The existence of a state of war was officially notified to the foreign powers by Japan on August 1st. Meanwhile the Japanese fleet was searching for the Chinese ships, which had retreated to Wei-hai-wei and the Gulf of Pechili; and Japan had temporarily complete command of the sea, so that she could transport troops freely to Korea. This she lost no time in doing, and from Hiroshima, the Japanese headquarters on the Inland Sea, a steady stream of troops was poured into Korea.

On September 3rd Field-Marshal Yamagata embarked with the 3rd Division at Hiroshima, and landed at Chemulpo, in Korea. Transportation was furnished by 31 vessels of the "Nippon Yusen Kaisha" line.

This column was joined by the troops already at Seoul, and became the 1st Army. It consisted of the 3rd Division (General Katsura) and the 5th Division (General Nodzu), probably 40,000 men in all.

It immediately commenced an advance northwards in the direction of Ping-Yang.

Meanwhile the Northern Chinese army, consisting chiefly of the Manchurian troops and Li Hung Chang's Tientsin corps, had crossed the Korean frontier and had moved south to Ping-Yang, causing the Japanese outposts to fall back before it.

Owing to its hopeless state of disorganization, lack of transport and vile roads, its progress was slow and painful, and the Japanese made no attempt to drive it back, knowing that the further the Chinese advanced, the greater their straits would become. The Chinese did not attempt to advance beyond Ping-Yang, a walled city of importance and position of great strength, and here they waited, their numbers having been augmented to about 20,000.

The Japanese now executed a masterly and daring movement. Their main column advancing very slowly, and establishing supply depots *en route*, moved up towards Ping-Yang, as if to attack the Chinese position in front. Meanwhile another Japanese detachment, consisting of about 1000 men, under Col. Sato, had disembarked at Gensan and was advancing westward over the difficult mountain ranges towards the Chinese left flank at Ping-Yang. On arriving at Kai-Song, Marshal Yamagata divided his army into three columns:

Gen. Nodsu, with 1 Div., on the left.

Gen. Oshima, with 1 Bde., in the centre.

Gen. Katsura, with 1 Bde., on the right.

On Sept. 11th the left column crossed the Tatung river at Hwang-Ju, and threatened the Chinese right flank. The right column moved off to the northeast, and joined Col. Sato's force from Gensan. These three columns, were now in constant communication by field telegraph, otherwise the subsequent combination could never have come off.

The Chinese having no system of reconnoitring, were ignorant of these movements, and concentrated their whole attention on the central Japanese column in front of them.

On Sept. 14th this column assaulted and captured the outlying forts which defended the bridge over the south arm of the Tatung river.

The next day, Sept. 15, this column further assaulted the redoubts guarding the main bridge into Ping-Yang, but without capturing them.

Simultaneously, however, the two other Japanese columns had closed, and Gen. Nodsu had captured the western defences of the city, whilst the right column was assaulting the eastern defences.

About nightfall the Chinese hoisted the signal of surrender, and the attack ceased.

The Chinese position was surrounded on three sides, but was left open to the rear, and in the night most of the Chinese escaped.

On the 16th, when the Japanese entered Ping-Yang, it presented the appearance of a deserted city.

For precision of calculation and brilliancy of achievement, this stroke of Japanese strategy has seldom been surpassed.

This crushing and signal defeat was the knell of Chinese influence in Korea, and the three Japanese columns forming the 1st army, having recombined, pressed steadily northwards, driving the remnants of the Chinese forces before them like chaff before the wind.

The Japanese advance throughout the war has been necessarily slow, owing to the almost total absence of roads and the very mountainous character of the theatre of war. In all cases their columns have proceeded with great deliberation, making new roads and collecting supplies before moving forward. Behind the Yalu river, which forms the frontier between Korea and China, the Chinese attempted to make another stand, and, in the absence of the Japanese army, they were enabled to establish a strong position here at Kiu-tien-cheng.

The Chinese Government had meanwhile become seriously alarmed at the situation, and decided on the despatch of reinforcements, by sea, to the Yalu river to support the troops in the Korea. With this end a fleet of transports, with some 7000 troops on board, was despatched from Tientsin, under the escort of the Chinese fleet, which was thus lured out of the Gulf of Pechil.

The Japanese fleet observed this movement, but made no attempt to oppose it, having a larger game in view. Allowing the Chinese fleet to reach the Yalu unmolested, the Japanese squadron converged and closed upon them, and caught them in a *cul-de-sac*, so to speak, at the mouth of the river. This was on Sept. 15.

I do not wish to trespass upon the province of naval tactics, but suffice it to say that in the battle which followed, the Japanese, besides their enormously superior strategic position, showed far greater skill in the handling of their guns and ships, and after a five hours' action, sunk 4 vessels of the Chinese fleet, besides disabling many others. The repl-