

comrads—this should be seen in advance by the colonel, who should designate his musicians or company cooks as hospital attendants with a white rag on their arm to indicate their office. A wounded man should go himself (if able) to the surgeon near at hand, or, if he need help he should receive it from one of the attendants and not a comrade. It is wonderful how soon the men accustom themselves to these simple rules. In great battles these matters call for a more enlarged attention, and then it becomes the duty of the division general to see that proper stretchers and field hospitals are ready for the wounded, and trenches are dug for the dead. There should be no real neglect of the dead, as it has a bad effect on the living, for each soldier values himself and comrades as highly as though he were living in a good house at home.

The regimental chaplain, if any, usually attends the burials from the hospital, and should make notes and communicate details to the captain of the company and to the family at home. Of course it is usually impossible to mark the graves with name, dates, etc., and consequently the names of the "unknown" in our national cemeteries equal about one half of all the dead.

Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, manoeuvring by corps, divisions and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and though our lines were deployed according to the tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish lines, taking every advantage of the shape of ground, and of every cover. We were generally the assailants, and in wooded and broken countries the "defensive" had a positive advantage over us, for they were always ready, had cover and always knew the ground to their immediate front, whereas, we, their assailants, had to grope our way over unknown ground and generally found a cleared field or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under a close and withering fire. Rarely did the opposing lines in compact order come into actual contact, but when, as at Peachtree Creek and at Atlanta, the lines did become commingled, the men fought individually in every possible style, more frequently with the musket clubbed, than with the bayonet, and in some instances the men clinched like wrestlers and went to the ground together. Europeans frequently criticised our war, because we did not always take full advantage of a victory; the true reason was that habitually the woods served as a screen, and we often did not realize the fact that our enemy had retreated, till he was already miles away and we again entrenched, having left a thin skirmish line to cover the movement and to fall back to the new position. Our war was fought with the muzzle loading rifle. Towards the close I had one brigade (Walcutt's) armed with breech loading "Spencer's," the cavalry generally had breech loading carbines, "Spencer's and Sharps," both of which were good arms. The only change that breech-loading arms will probably make in the art and practice of war, will be to increase the amount of ammunition to be expended and necessarily to be carried along; to still further "thin out" the lines of attack, and to reduce battles to short, quick, decisive conflicts. It does not in the least affect the grand strategy, or the necessity for perfect organization, drill and discipline. The companies and battalions will be more dispersed, and the men will be less under the immediate eye of their officers, and therefore a higher order of intelli-

gence and courage on the part of the individual soldier will be an element of strength.

When a regiment is employed as skirmishers, and crosses an open field or woods, under heavy fire, if each man runs forward from tree to tree, or stump to stump, and yet preserves a good general alignment, it will give great confidence to the men themselves, for they always keep their eyes well to the right and left and watch their comrades; but when some few hold back, stick too close or too long to a comfortable log, it often stops the whole line and defeats the whole object. Therefore, the more we improve the firearm, the more will be the necessity of good organization, good discipline and intelligence on the part of the individual soldier and officer. There is, of course, such a thing as individual courage, which has a value in war, but familiarity with danger, experience in war and its common attendants and personal habit, are equally valuable traits, and these are the qualities with which we usually have to deal in war. All men naturally shrink from pain and danger, and only incur its risks from some higher motive or from habit, and I would define true courage to be, a perfect sensibility of the measure of danger, and a mental willingness to incur it, rather than that insensibility to danger of which I have heard far more than I have seen. The most courageous men are generally unconscious of possessing the quality, and, therefore, when one professes it too openly by words or bearing, there is reason to mistrust it. I would further illustrate my meaning by describing a man of true courage to be one who possesses all his faculties and senses perfectly, when serious danger is actually present.

Modern wars have not materially changed the relative values or proportions of the several arms of service: infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineers. If anything, the infantry has been increased in value. The danger of cavalry attempting to charge infantry armed with breech loading rifles was fully illustrated at Sedan, and with us very frequently. So improbable has such a thing become that we have omitted the infantry square from our recent tactics. Still, cavalry against cavalry and as auxiliary to infantry will always be valuable, whilst all great wars will, as heretofore, depend chiefly on the infantry. Artillery is more valuable with new and inexperienced troops than with veterans. In the early stages of the war, the field guns often bore the proportion of six to a thousand men, towards the close of the war one gun, or at most two, to a thousand men, was deemed enough. Sieges, such as characterized the wars of the last century, are too slow for this period of the world, and the Prussians recently almost ignored them altogether, penetrated France between the forts, and left a superior force "in observation" to watch the garrison and accept its surrender when the greater events of the war made further resistance useless—but earth forts, and especially field works, will hereafter play an important part in wars, because they enable a minor force to hold a superior one in check for a time, and time is a most valuable element in all wars. It was one of Professor Mahan's maxims that the spade was as useful in war as the musket, and to this I will add the axe. The habit of entrenching certainly does have the effect of making new troops timid. When a line of battle is once covered by a good parapet made by the engineers or by the labor of the men, it does require an effort to make them leave it in the face of danger; but when the enemy is entrenched it becomes

absolutely necessary to permit each brigade and division of the troops immediately disposed, to throw up a corresponding trench for their own protection in case of a sudden sally. We invariably did this in our recent campaigns, and it had no ill effects, though sometimes our troops were a little too slow in leaving their well covered lines, to assail the enemy in position or on retreat. Even our skirmishers were in the habit of rolling logs together, or of making a lunette of rails with dirt in front of cover their bodies, and though it revealed their position I cannot say that it worked a bad effect; so that as a rule it may safely be left to the men themselves. On the "defensive" there is no doubt of the propriety of fortifying, but the assailing army the general must watch closely to see that the men do not neglect an opportunity to drop his precautionary defences, and act promptly on the "offensive" at every chance.

I have many a time crept forward on the skirmish line to avail myself of the cover of the pickets' "little fort" to observe more closely some expected result, and I always talked familiarly with the men, and was astonished to see how well they comprehended the general object, and how accurately they were informed of the state of facts existing miles away from their particular corps. Soldiers are very quick to catch the general drift and purpose of a campaign, and are always sensible when they are well commanded or well cared for. Once impressed with this fact, and that they are making progress, they bear cheerfully any amount of labor and privation.

In camp, and especially in the presence of an active enemy, it is much easier to maintain discipline than in barracks in time of peace. Crime and breaches of discipline are much less frequent, and the necessity for courts martial for less. The captain can usually inflict all the punishment necessary, and the colonel should always. The field officers' court is the best form for war, viz., one of the field officers—the lieutenant, colonel or major—can examine the case and report his verdict, and the colonel should execute it. Of course there are statutory offences which demand a general court-martial, and these must be ordered by the division or corps commander; but the presence of one of our regular civilian judge-advocates in an army in the field would be a first-class nuisance, for technical courts always work mischief. Too many courts-martial in any command is evidence of poor discipline and inefficient officers.

For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering a large space of ground, the magnetic telegraph is far the best, though habitually the paper and pencil, with good mounted orderlies, answer every purpose. I have little faith in the signal service by flags and torches, though we always used them; because almost invariably when they were most needed, the views was cut off by intervening trees, or by mists or fogs. There was one notable instance in my experience; when the signal flags carried a message of vital importance over the heads of Hood's army, which had interposed between me and Alatoona, and broken the telegraph wires—as recorded in my "Recollection;" but the value of the magnetic telegraph in war cannot be exaggerated, as was illustrated by the perfect concert of action between the armies in Virginia and in Georgia in all 1864. Hardly a day intervened when General Grant did not know the exact state of facts with me, more than 1,500 miles off as the wires ran. So on the field a thin insulated wire may be run on improvised stakes or from tree to