the lawyers on both sides of the House. Another bill of a similar nature has also been introduced by a private member, to make a defendant and his wife competent and compellable to give evidence on indictments for non-repair of highways, &c., or for a nuisance, or other proceedings for the purpose of trying a civil right only. We agree with some of those who took part in the discussion, that such important alterations as these in the Criminal Law, (and especially important in that they may be a step to a more radical change,) should emanate from the Government, or, at least, that the head of the proper Department should take them up as Government measures.

The Court of Appeal has been trying to circumscribe the limits of citation among American "authorities," so-called. One learned judge thought it would be of no value to cite Utah decisions on questions as to the property and rights of married women. Another considered that unless some case in point could be found nearer than California, he would not feel himself bound by a decision so far to the west. But speaking seriously, the complaints from the bench as to the multitudinous citation of cases which may be found almost wholesale in United States text books and digests is well-founded. It is hard enough to master the legitimate authorities, but no judge could find time to go through the mass of American case law to elucidate the matter in hand. The line should be drawn so as to include the decisions of the Supreme Court, and in other well-known reports, such as Paige, Sanford, Pickering and Wendell, and of such well-known Judges as Kent, Story, Shaw and Parsons, but outside of this, the Court should make no note of what is cited. Our law has not yet come to the pass adverted to in the *Central Law Journal*, "that the reported decisions of any judge, no matter where or when, no matter how much or how little of a jurist he may have been is more potent with nine out of ten Courts than any amount of reasoning and logic."

DISSENTING JUDGMENTS.

Our former article thus entitled has provoked a good deal of hostile criticism in the columns of our Quebec contemporary, *The Legal News*. The practice of the Privy Council in delivering one judgment which represents the joint opinion of the Court, though pronounced an admirable practice by the last editor of Austin's Jurisprudence, finds no favour with the Montreal critic. The sole reason given is the very insufficient one "that the suppression of dissentient opinions has proved highly inconvenient in several cases....in passing over important issues on which both parties desired an opinion." It may gratify the individuals interested in the particular case to have all its niceties explored, and each judge giving his views thereon; but regarding the matter from the broader point of view of the profession, such judgments do not declare the law except in so far as the judges concur in the matter decided. All else is in the nature of *obiter dicta* and the accumulation of such opinions in the reports is by all thoughtful jurists deprecated. Life is too short for the professional man to master the growing accumulations of the law, even when most carefully expurgated in the reports. Why should he further be compelled to waste time in finding out what is decided by going through the reasonings of each particular judge and aggregating the results? With all deference to opposite views, we