

already recorded our persuasion, that Mr. Madison was entangled in the toils of French intrigue; and we have not formed that opinion without, as we think, sufficient evidence. Still we do not desire to convey the impression, in itself preposterous, that either Mr. Madison or his coadjutors were so devoid of patriotism, as to be simply desirous of serving France, without a primary regard to what they considered would best conduce to the interests of their own country. It may be asked, however, how could it enter

into their minds to suppose that the interests of the United States would be best promoted by selecting for their adversary the one of the two offending nations which, in peace, maintained with them the closest relations, founded on a commerce eminently prosperous and profitable; and, in war, had the means of giving them the heaviest blows? The force of this objection was felt by the minority, whose language we have already quoted: "If it were deemed expedient (they urged) to exercise our right of selecting our

sense dictated the choice of an enemy, from whose hostility we had nothing to dread. A war with France would equally have satisfied our insulted honour, and at the same time, instead of annihilating, would have revived and extended our commerce—and even the evils of such a contest would have been mitigated by the sublime consolation, that by our efforts we were contributing to arrest the progress of despotism in Europe, and essentially serving the great interests of freedom and humanity throughout the world. Because a republican government, depending solely for its support on the wishes and affections of the people, ought never to declare a war, into which the great body of the nation are not prepared to enter with zeal and alacrity: as where the justice and necessity of the measure are not so apparent as to unite all parties in its support, its inevitable tendency is, to augment the dissensions that have before existed, and by exasperating party violence to its utmost height, prepare the way for civil war. Because, before a war was declared, it was perfectly well ascertained, that a vast majority of the people in the middle and northern states, by whom the burden and expenses of the contest must be borne almost exclusively, were strongly opposed to the measure. Because we see no rational prospect of attaining, by force of arms, the objects for which our rulers say we are contending—and because the evils and distresses which the war must of necessity occasion, far overbalance any advantages we can expect to derive from it. Because the great power of England on the ocean, and the amazing resources she derives from commerce and navigation, render it evident, that we cannot compel her to respect our rights and satisfy our demands, otherwise than by a successful maritime warfare; the means of conducting which we not only do not possess, but our rulers have obstinately refused to provide. Because the exhausted state of the treasury, occasioned by the destruction of the revenue derived from commerce, should the war continue, will render necessary a resort to loans and taxes to a vast amount—measures by which the people will be greatly burthened, and oppressed, and the influence and patronage of the executive alarmingly increased. And, finally,

because of a war begun with such means as our rulers had prepared, and conducted in the mode they seem resolved to pursue, we see no grounds to hope the honourable and successful termination."

"Whereas the late revocation of the British Orders in Council, has removed the great and ostensible cause of the present war, and prepared the way for an immediate accommodation of all existing differences, inasmuch as, by the confession of the present secretary of state, satisfactory and honourable arrangements might easily be made, by which the abuses resulting from the impressment of our seamen, might, in future, be effectually prevented—Therefore,

Resolved, That we shall be constrained to consider the determination on the part of our rulers to continue the present war, after official notice of the revocation of the British Orders in Council, as affording conclusive evidence, that the war has been undertaken from motives entirely distinct from those which have been hitherto avowed, and for the promotion of objects wholly unconnected with the interest and honour of the American nation.

Resolved, That we contemplate with abhorrence, even the possibility of an alliance with the present Emperor of France, every action of whose life has demonstrated, that the attainment, by any means, of universal empire, and the consequent extinction of every vestige of freedom, are the sole objects of his incessant, unbounded, and remorseless ambition. His arms, with the spirit of freemen, we might openly and fearlessly encounter; but, of his secret arts, his corrupting influence, we entertain a dread we can neither conquer nor conceal. It is therefore with the utmost distrust and alarm, that we regard his late professions of attachment and love to the American people, fully recollecting, that his invariable course has been, by perfidious offers of protection, by deceitful professions of friendship, to lull his intended victims into the fatal sleep of confidence and security, during which, the chains of despotism are silently wound round and rivetted on them."

In the same strain, during the debate on