

7.

DEA/6386-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 220

New York, February 3, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL. OPIMMEDIATE.

Repeat for Information: Washington, London, NATO Paris, Paris, Geneva, CCOS, DND, CGS, CAS, DNI, DMI, DAI, Ottawa from Ottawa, Cairo (Deferred) from Ottawa.

By Bag Pretoria, Accra, Lagos, Moscow, Dublin, Tel Aviv, Leopoldville from London.

#### CONGO: NEW USA APPROACH

Noyes (USA) called on me this afternoon to explain, on instructions from Washington, a new USA approach to the problem of the Congo. He read from a brief the main portion of which is as follows: Begins: The approach is as follows:

(a) A broadly based Congolese Government should be established as soon as possible. If various member states support this and encourage those concerned to establish a broadly based government, we believe it can be achieved and can bring about stability in Congo. A return to constitutionality under the Chief of State is essential.

(b) We also support the proposal of Secretary-General for a new mandate giving UN authority to bring under control all principal military elements in Congo and thus to neutralize the role of Congolese forces in the politics of the country. Under this mandate UN troops could undertake training of Congolese troops. We would also expect UN to step up its efforts to prevent all outside assistance from coming into the Congo.

(c) The UN civilian operation in the Congo should be increased and improved so that it can effectively assist the Congo and provide the only channel for external assistance.

When the military neutralization of Congolese forces is at least well under way and it is certain that a civil war has been averted, we believe that Secretary-General would be able to obtain the release and secure the protection of political prisoners. We also believe the establishment of a new, moderate and broadly based government would be essential if Secretary-General can be expected to have any success on this question. Ends.

2. Noyes described this as a genuine effort to find a middle of the road approach which would command the approval of the more moderate Afro-Asians and the acquiescence at least of all the interested powers. He hoped that in this way the powers concerned could draw back gradually from the "abyss" that faced them if UN failed in the Congo.

3. In reply to my question he said he thought that the two processes of pacification and forming a broadly based government could proceed together. Indeed he seemed to envisage that pacification and neutralization of the Congolese forces would flow from the political agreement that would come in the course of establishing a broadly based government, and that other means of enforcing the new mandate proposed for Secretary-General would only be considered if this did not repeat not succeed. You will see that this approach bears a considerable similarity to that described to us by Weischhoff (our telegram 216 February 3† refers).