

were held. They made a declaration which offered the East a balance and a constructive relationship. They made it clear that the West did not aspire to strategic superiority and the West respected the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests. These are statements out of Brussels in December, a meeting attended by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. MacEachen), a meeting where he played an important role getting these points accepted.

● (1120)

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

Mr. Trudeau: In accordance with our initiative, East and West have now agreed to resume the MBFR talks in Vienna on March 16, and they have agreed that foreign ministers should play a more active role in stimulating progress at those talks.

At our insistence, NATO foreign ministers participated early last month in the opening of the Stockholm Conference to underline the importance they attached to high-level political dialogue. The Warsaw Pact foreign ministers responded to this Western move and also went to Stockholm. Of special significance was the presence in Stockholm—and it would not have happened otherwise—of U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who met for over five hours. Both also met with my colleague the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Broad political contact was thus re-established between the countries of East and West for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September, in the shadow of the Korean airliner tragedy.

Even Prime Minister Thatcher has taken steps to improve contacts between East and West. Her visit to Budapest last week is a further signal of momentum in East-West dialogue—a determination to seek out areas of understanding between members of opposing alliances, and to promote a reassuring clarity about intentions.

In contrast to earlier statements, President Reagan twice last month signalled a constructive tone in American policy toward the U.S.S.R. The response from Moscow has been mixed—elements of tough rhetoric together with signs of a cautious readiness to reopen lines of communication.

I have, Mr. Speaker, just returned from consultations with the leaders of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Romania. Those countries represent a middle-European geography, and a middle-power psychology, with long experience of East-West tensions.

Obviously they are closely allied to the Soviet Union. But their leadership, their influence and their identity are, in present circumstances, significant. I found, for example, a very positive response to my suggestion that the middle powers of each alliance could play a constructive part in reviving habits of consultation at the highest levels of East-West politics.

I gave them our Western perspective on the decline of détente, and on the importance of its renewal, and I listened to

their own. We talked about the mixture of signals between East and West, and about the need to go beyond an improvement in rhetoric toward acts and gestures to restore confidence and reduce tensions.

I return with several conclusions from my talks in Eastern Europe.

First, I was struck by the contrast between the cordial, reasonable, and non-ideological private talks, and the occasional blast of Warsaw Pact fundamentalism to which we were subjected in public. I believe this disparity underlines the importance of personal contact and private dialogue. To without that dialogue, both sides risk remaining prisoners of their own polemic.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

● (1125)

Mr. Trudeau: Second, because we were able in our private talks to strip away much of the invective surrounding key issues, I believe we were able to begin a process of exposing areas of common interest. That process will take time, but I dare hope that a new level of maturity in East-West relations is within our grasp.

Third, if we are to reach that level of maturity, we shall have to grapple with difficult problems of misperception on both sides—blind spots and distortions, subjective errors of analysis or of judgment.

Few of my interlocutors, for example, seemed genuinely able to perceive, let alone concede, the gravity of the threat posed to western countries by the deployment of Soviet SS-20s. And for our part, I wondered whether we in the West had not significantly underestimated the full impact on the East of the combination of INF deployment with the harsh rhetoric of recent years.

It will be uphill work to gain a more accurate perception of each other and to gauge more accurately the consequences of our various words and deeds. From a confrontational deadlock, where INF deployment must continue and negotiations must be restored, only the "third rail" of political confidence and communication can ensure an early and constructive outcome.

In reflecting on these conclusions, and on the substance of my talks in Eastern and Western capitals alike, it is clear to me that areas of common interest are beginning to emerge. Let me suggest ten principles of a common bond between East and West:

- (1) Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- (2) Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- (3) Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
- (4) Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- (5) Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.