

*Supply—National Defence*

answering questions, to raise for us and the people of Canada the insecurity blackout.

We were pleased to have the minister's assurance that Canada would continue to support NATO. As a member of the NATO collective alliance, as well as because of its geographic position and political role, Canada is committed, as set out in paragraph 2 of the white paper, in three major spheres. They are, as the minister told us earlier, first, the defence against an attack on the North American continent; second, the collective defence and deterrent forces of NATO in Europe and the north Atlantic; and, third, the United Nations, to assist that organization in attaining its peaceful aims.

First, the defence against an attack on the North American continent. Knowing that both the great powers in the world, the United States and the U.S.S.R., have stock-piles of atomic and thermonuclear weapons which they can deliver in various ways, including manned bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, we are living in an uneasy state of military stalemate.

Western strategy has been based on the concept that as long as we have the capability of retaliating against a Russian attack with a blow of sufficient magnitude as to knock out all of their major cities and industrial centres, that the consequence of any action on the part of the Russians would be so great as to deter them. While the deterrent force will not necessarily prevent limited wars in various trouble spots around the globe, it seems to be a requisite to the prevention of an all-out Russian offensive. There is, of course, no guarantee, and we in the western world have no alternative but to maintain our deterrent strength until a real and enforceable agreement for universal disarmament can be reached.

Canada's role in North American defence has been primarily to assist in the defence of the United States retaliatory power. We are committed to this strategy and geographically we are on the front line of North America. Even if we wished to divorce ourselves from such a policy we could not. While North American defence measures are primarily to protect the deterrent, they do at the same time in an incidental way provide some degree of protection to our civilian population. Put very simply, it is true to say that every bomber knocked down before it reaches the target areas means less destruction and less fallout in the more populated areas. Similarly, if an anti-missile missile is developed, every missile contacted and exploded at high altitudes would mean less destruction and less fallout at ground level.

No one has suggested that there is any such thing as a complete defence. The mighty

Goliath with his great armour fell to the well directed stone from David's sling; but while it has always been true that defence is at best only a partial thing, it seems unreasonable to take the attitude that if we cannot save all of our people and all of our cities, there is no point in making any effort to save as large a proportion as possible, provided of course that the effort to this end is not interfering with other and more essential defence effort.

The United States has told us that at the present time the greatest threat to the North American continent is from Russian bombers. Each passing year will see it diminish relative to the increasing importance of intercontinental and other missiles. In protecting the United States retaliatory force, the military chiefs and government of the United States have decided that they will not only have to develop at the greatest possible speed a defence against missiles, but also maintain for the foreseeable future an effective resistance to manned bombers.

Their concept in this regard is called a defence in depth: First, the manned interceptors, in order to knock down as many attacking bombers as possible before they reach their targets or before they are able to launch their air-to-ground missiles, second, an area defence of ground-to-air Bomarc missiles; and finally a spot defence of Nike ground-to-air missiles. Apparently the Canadian government accepts this concept but having accepted it they have made no effort to implement it on a continental basis. We now have the incredible distortion whereby for Canada—now that our CF-100 squadrons are obsolete—the Bomarc is our first line of defence, with United States interceptor squadrons as secondary support. Canada is now faced with three alternatives:

1. To continue with its present policy in which case in the event of war most of the fighting, most of the destruction and a high percentage of the radioactive atomic fall-out would take place over the southern two or three hundred mile strip of Canada where most of our people live.

2. Allowing the United States air force to establish interceptor squadron bases on Canadian soil, or

3. Buying United States interceptors to re-equip R.C.A.F. squadrons.

I maintained at the time the Avro Arrow was cancelled, and still maintain, that it was cancelled without due consideration to the whole consequences of the action and in addition the provision of the Bomarc was, and still is, of questionable value in many ways. The minister has given us such a vague conglomeration of jumbled jargon about the