

Collective security arrangements have in large measure already provided a guarantee of this nature for the allies of the great nuclear powers. The non-aligned and neutral nations do not enjoy similar guarantees, and it is within their ranks that the spread of nuclear weapons is more likely to take place within the next decade.

For that reason alone, it seems to me probable that there will be an increasing tendency to correlate a guarantee of that nature with proposals which take as their point of departure the terms of the Irish resolution. That resolution, adopted at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, constitutes the only norm of non-dissemination which up to now has been generally accepted. It calls on all states to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing a reciprocal set of undertakings: an undertaking by the nuclear states not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons, or to transmit the information necessary for their manufacture to states not possessing such weapons; and an undertaking by states not possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring control of such weapons. There is a pressing need, in my judgement, for the elaboration of an international agreement or agreements on that basis.

This would mean starting with a notion of how to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons that is well known and whose limitations are fully understood. The adoption of the reciprocal pledges contained in the Irish resolution would not result in any nation being deprived of such provisions for its security -- nuclear or otherwise -- as it may currently enjoy. And the nuclear powers would only be giving formal recognition to a tacit understanding which has governed their relations for the last few years -- namely, that they will not hand over the undivided or independent control of nuclear weapons to states which do not already possess them.

Upon that minimum reciprocal undertaking a system of viable measures might over the course of time be constructed which would make full use and depend for its effectiveness upon the operation of existing bodies within the United Nations system.

I have in mind for example, as part of such an overall system, an extension of the present safeguards procedures. As these procedures stand, they apply essentially to assistance derived by one country from another in the peaceful uses of the atom. They do not, on the whole, apply to a country's peaceful nuclear programmes to the extent that they are carried out without outside assistance. That may be one direction, therefore, in which we could move forward, looking to the day when nuclear and non-nuclear states alike might be prepared to put all their non-military nuclear programmes under the safeguards procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

There is another direction in which progress may be possible. The present safeguards procedures are designed to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons. They do not relate to the transfer of control of such weapons. That suggests that the time has come when it might be useful to consider some supplementary mechanism which would deal with situations where: