

to a peace process – and not just buying time until a more favourable opportunity arrives – confirms that one is also justified in complying with the agreement. Repeated and verifiable demonstrations that an opponent is meeting its obligations confirms that an adversary's intentions are benevolent. This distinction between CBMs and CSBMs will be applied here.

Finally and, perhaps, most importantly, confidence building involves transcending communications barriers and establishing trust and *transparency* where none currently exists. Stedman and Rothchild argue that peace agreements usually fail because “fear is high and trust is low among antagonists,” and parties, therefore, “may fail to carry out their commitments in the belief that their adversary will take advantage of them.” Ubiquitous in the literature on African conflicts are statements to this effect. In Angola, for example, the UN Special Envoy, Margaret Anstee, observed the ideological differences, the radically dissimilar personalities and the “deep personal animosity” between the leaders of UNITA and the MPLA. “The gulf of personal mistrust between the two was so vast as to be probably unbridgeable,” she later wrote. “I hardly ever attended a meeting with either that did not contain some comment of suspicion or disdain – even contempt – for his rival.”<sup>8</sup> Profound mistrust and an inability to forgive are best understood not as a result of rational conflicts of *interests* but as the legacy of the unthinkable atrocities that may have been committed by one community against another. In view of the episodes of violence between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, author René Lemarchand cites former Rwandan President Kayibanda's comments that “there is no intercourse and no sympathy [between the nations. They] are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zones, or inhabitants of different planets.”<sup>9</sup> In yet another remark concerning the political divide between the north and south in the Sudan, Aggrey Jaden, of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), argued that “there can never be a basis of unity between the [north and south]. There is nothing in common between the various sections of the community; no body of shared beliefs, no identity of interests, no local signs of unity and above all, the Sudan has failed to compose a single community.”<sup>10</sup> Obviously these are not conditions which are conducive to conflict resolution and cooperation.

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<sup>8</sup> Margaret Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), p. 147.

<sup>9</sup> Cited in René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 169. The fact that recent wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone have been marked by atrocities ranging from the severing of limbs, gouging of eyes and instances of rape – but frequently *not* death – means that civilians are continually reminded of the cruelty of their adversary.

<sup>10</sup> Cited in Francis M. Deng, “Sudan's Conflict of Identities,” in I. William Zartman ed., *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars* (Washington: Brookings, 1995), p. 87.