

demonstrated.”⁸⁶ And UNSCOM, one of the most comprehensive and intrusive arms control efforts, unlike most international inspections, was initially backed up by the threat of retaliatory air strikes when Iraq balked. Even then, it was eventually forced to withdraw.

One approach to the perceived problems of arms control in dealing with WMD which has been adopted, particularly by the United States, is what is referred to as “counter-proliferation”. The distinction drawn by Washington between nonproliferation policies and counter-proliferation policies is subtle but not insignificant in terms of multilateral arms control efforts. A 1994, memo from the National Security Council (NSC) Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Non-proliferation and Export Controls to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs and to Ashton Carter, then Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Security and Counter Proliferation stated that:

“Proliferation is the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities and the missiles to deliver them. ...Non-proliferation is the use of the full range of political, economic and military tools to prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically or protect our interests against an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles should that prove necessary. Non-proliferation tools include intelligence, global non-proliferation norms and agreements, diplomacy, export controls, security assurances, defences and the application of military forces. ...Counter-proliferation refers to the activities of the Department of Defence (DOD) across the full range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls and intelligence collection and analysis, with particular responsibility for assuring U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles.”⁸⁷

The Clinton administration’s latest national security strategy statement declares the “spread of dangerous technologies” as a threat to American interests and pledges to support arms control measures to address this threat.⁸⁸ In 1994, the President declared it to be “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States.” A September 1999 report by the National Intelligence Council warned that the spread of medium-range missiles represents an “immediate, serious and growing threat” to American and allied forces.⁸⁹ While non-proliferation policies have been adopted to deal with these threats, the American view is that the spread of WMD and missiles to rogue states and possibly terrorist groups, constitutes the

⁸⁶ Michael O’Hanlon, *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Press, 2000), pp. 162-4.

⁸⁷ As quoted in Brian Bates and Chris McHorney, *Developing a Theoretical Model of Counterproliferation*, p.201.

⁸⁸ United States, The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.:December 1999), p. 2.

⁸⁹ Bates and McHorney, *Developing a Theoretical Model*, pp. 12, 14.