

One must ask what role can conditionality play in influencing responses to democratic transitions, but reflect also as to influencing civilians at the same time so as to inhibit the recent emergence of authoritarian electoral regimes. The goal must be to steadily transform civil control into democratic control. There is no democracy without subordination, but there can be subordination without democracy. Ostensibly, external actors would seek to promote the shift in the balance of power in favor of civilian supremacy by strengthening civil institutions which can harness military expertise yet reaffirm civilian supremacy. Isolating the military from social and economic currents can be detrimental to democratic stability, and in some contexts has favored coup activity. The military must be exposed to diverse interests and forces within a plural civil society. This implies an interaction and ongoing dialogue between the civil and military sector. It also implies avoiding poorly conceived, top down bureaucratic military down-sizing without appropriate consideration of the economic and social conditions in which the reductions including demobilizations take place.<sup>3</sup>

What may be required is further professionalization of armies, as a means of controlling them politically and financially--which does not necessarily imply weakening the military or sharply cutting its budget. To the contrary, specialists have argued that democratization in certain countries (Ghana or Nicaragua perhaps) will be consolidated through further professionalization of the military and institutionalization of political command with civilian oversight--both costly propositions. Objective control may mean maximizing the professionalism of the military since obedience to civilians is at the heart of professionalism, thus insuring civilian control. The point however should not be exaggerated, as political scientist Samuel Huntington perhaps does, in arguing that maximizing professionalism is best achieved by getting the military out of politics and, similarly, getting the politicians out of the military.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Bonn International Center for Conversion, "Conversion and the Integration of Economic and Security Decisions," Report No. 1, January, 1995, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Samuel Huntington, *The soldier and the State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), pp. 83-85.