1980 and 1984, broken down as follows:

Direct war damage	US$millions 1,610
Extra defence expenditure	3,060
Higher transport and energy costs	970
Lost exports & tourism	230
Smuggling	190
Refugees	660
Reduced production	800
Lost economic growth	2,000
Boycotts & embargos	260
Trading arrangements	340
TOTAL	10,120[30]

Escalating destabilization in 1985 and 1986 cost an estimated additional US$15 billion, bringing the total cost for the period 1980 to 1986 to over US$25 billion.[31]

This staggering damage is twice the combined foreign aid received by all nine SADCC members during this period. It equals half the total SADCC exports; five times the projected costs of all SADCC projects; and is roughly equivalent to the total 1984 GDP of the SADCC countries. The overwhelming bulk of these costs have been borne by Angola and Mozambique.

Official Mozambican figures show that between 1981 and 1983, 140 villages were destroyed, together with 900 rural shops, 840 schools and over 200 health posts. The total cost was estimated at US$3.8 billion, or roughly twice the pre-1975 GDP. Over the next two years, despite Mozambique's non-aggression pact with South Africa, the damage was even greater. More than 1,800 schools were closed down together with an additional 300 health posts. By the end of 1985 total damage was estimated at US$5 billion.[32] Prior to 1981 Mozambique made modest, but important economic progress. However the massive destruction orchestrated by South Africa has now virtually destroyed the national economy. A *negative* growth rate of -7% in 1983 was followed by one of -14% in 1984 and -20% in 1985. Mozambique's debt service ratio is now officially estimated at between 160% and 190% of *planned* 1987 export revenues.[33]

South Africa has achieved most of its aims in Mozambique. All ANC cadres have been expelled, Samora Machel is dead, FRELIMO's socialist project lies in tatters, and the Mozambican people are exhausted by a generation of war and six years of famine. Mozambique is today economically more dependent than ever on South Africa. One-third of its US$180 million foreign revenues in 1985 originated in South Africa. Despite a recent 800% devaluation, and the deep cuts in social spending, Mozambique is obliged to spend 42% of its budget — itself financed by "the timely arrival of grants or credits" — on defence.[34]

The costs in Angola have been, if anything, even higher. Official Angolan figures speak of 60,000 dead, over 600,000 internal refugees and total damage estimated at US$12 billion since the first South Africa invasion in 1975. Over 50% of Angola's budget is now devoted to defence. Angola has the highest number of war paraplegics per capita as a result of the UNITA practice of mining peasant farms. While Angola has partly been able to cushion these costs through oil and diamond exports, the 1986 collapse of the oil price led to a 50% cut in imports of consumer goods, and a drop in imports of intermediate goods to one-third the 1985 level.[35]

The burden on the other South African countries has been heavy though not of the same order. Prolonged destabilization of Lesotho precipitated a coup in January 1986. The new government concluded a security agreement which gives Pretoria the right to vet all refugees in Lesotho, and has been rewarded with joint development projects dangled for 20 years before its predecessor. An attempt to foment an MNR-like dissident problem in Zimbabwe seems to have been crushed, but Zimbabwe is obliged to maintain a substantial military establishment and a permanent military presence along the Beira corridor at the cost of some Z$12 million a month. Defence spending now consumes 16% of the Zimbabwean budget, forcing sharp cuts in key development and social programmes.[36]

SADCC's original vision of steadily reduced economic dependence on South African has been shattered. The central prop of SADCC strategy — an alternative regional transport system, centred around Mozambique — has been virtually destroyed. The total debt of SADCC countries stands at US$16.6 billion, or roughly 66% of their combined GDP. Tanzania and Zambia all have debt service ratios of over 80%.[37]

Other costs cannot be measured. The psychological trauma of a generation of war; the profound loss of hope and now prevailing apathy throughout much of the region; the social and economic consequences of the loss of precious skilled personnel (especially health and education workers) routinely selected as targets by UNITA and the MNR; these are costs which cannot be reduced to cold statistics. It is likewise difficult to measure precisely the cost of a generation of militarization of political struggles, the reduction in just six short years of all efforts to forge economic independence, and reasonable living standards for the peoples of the region to a remorseless war for simple survival. The militarization of politics, of planning, of most economic decisions, of cultural life — indeed the subordination of much of daily living throughout large areas of Southern Africa to military exigencies — these must exact a very heavy toll in the years to come.

The tragic fact remains that peoples of Southern Africa will know no peace while the *apartheid* regime remains in power in Pretoria. This is the inescapable truth confronting Canadian policy in the region.