

and, on top of that, you have electronic intelligence-gathering satellites which give you a whole range of other information about what the other side is doing — suggest that you could actually observe any tests of new weapons which were being carried out by either side. In fact, the American Defense Department admitted this when it published a list of about a dozen tests it was planning to carry out in connection with the SDI programme because it knew that the Russians could observe them, so they thought they might as well own up in advance. Of course, the Americans are always telling us that they have observed what the Russians are doing in this field as well.

My feeling is that it is very much easier to detect the development and, even more, the deployment of a new weapon, than to tell whether a particular existing weapon you have observed comes within permitted arms control ceiling. From the verification point of view, it is much easier to verify a freeze than a limitation on weapons.

If you could get some sort of ban on the modernization of weapons, then I think it would be easier for both sides to agree to reduce their existing forces to levels which no longer posed even a putative threat of a first strike. I think the Soviet suggestion of a 50 per cent cut in existing arsenals, with some adjustments, would probably serve in this area.

My own feeling about the latest Soviet proposal, so far as I know it — and we still rely, in the first place, on leaks from Washington and then on Soviet attempts to correct mistakes in those leaks — is that the new Soviet proposals offer a sensible basis for negotiation, although I think very hard negotiation will be needed on the point at which you cut off the modernization on both sides and, secondly, on which weapons are included in the various categories, particularly whether you include long-range theatre nuclear forces such as the SS-20 and the Cruise and Pershing missiles, and, of course, very difficult negotiations will arise on precisely what particular weapons are included in each category you are discussing.

My own feeling is that the sensible approach to this — though it is so obvious that governments will never accept it — is that, if you agree in principle on the sort of limitation of warhead numbers which both sides are suggesting, the sensible thing would be to allow your opponent to decide where the cuts should come, because he knows what worries him. It is the worry on each side which is the main cause of war. Perhaps your Institute might give some thought to