

effects, does not probably attend to all the effects which his conduct, in this instance, is likely to produce, either to himself, or to the person whom he relieves : and of human actions in general, it may be observed, that their consequences always extend much farther than the design or foresight of the agent. Beings of superior intelligence might regard mankind as incapable of design, with just as much reason as we have to deny the brutes any guiding principle superior to blind and simple instinct. We, however, are conscious of design ; though our designs are commonly narrow, and our views limited : why, then, consign the inferior animals to the guidance of an unmeaning impulse ? Were it proper to enter more minutely at present into a discussion of this point, it might be easy to prove, by an induction of particulars, that the brutes actually compare ideas, and deduce inferences ; and when we consider their docility, and mark the variety of their manners, it appears almost absurd to deny that they form designs, and look backward on the past, and forward towards the future, as well as we.

We may conclude, then, with respect to the inferior animals, that they possess in general, the powers of perception, memory, consciousness ; with various affections, passions, and internal feelings ; and even, though perhaps in a meaner degree, those powers of comparing and judging which are necessary to enable an animated being to form designs, and to direct its actions to certain ends.—Their prospects towards the future are evidently very confined : They cannot review the past with such a steady eye as man : imagination is not, with them, so vigorous and active as with us, and is confined within a narrower range. But still they are not absolutely confined to present sensations ; they connect some part of the past and of the future with the present. When we contem-

plate their manners, we behold not social intercourse regulated among them by the same forms as among us : Their characters and circumstances differ so considerably from ours, that though the great principles of right and wrong, may, wherever they are perceived, remain the same to them as to us, yet the application of those principles to particular cases must be very different among them from what it is with us. Thus, philosophers have fancied imaginary states of human society, in which the present laws of distributive and commutative justice could not be observed : but even in such states of society, the fundamental principles of justice would continue obligatory, and would only be varied in their application. The brutes appear, in short, to possess, but in a more imperfect degree, the same faculties as mankind. Instinct must always be a simple principle, an original feeling ; the only business of which is to rouse to action,—to call the reasoning powers to exert themselves. To talk of instinctive principles that admit of improvement, and accommodate themselves to circumstances, is merely to introduce new terms into the language of philosophy. No such improvement or accommodation to circumstances can ever take place without a comparison of ideas, and a deduction of inferences. When we consider with how much difficulty that acquaintance with the manners and customs of mankind, which we call *knowledge of the world*, is obtained, we cannot be surprised that even philosophers should be so imperfectly acquainted with the more minute particulars in the manners and economy of the brutes. To man their manners are much less interesting than those of his own species ; and there are, besides, many difficulties to prevent us from becoming intimately acquainted with them, however earnestly we may turn our attention to this object.

BIOGRAPHICAL ANECDOTES OF JEDEDIAH BUXTON.

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BIOGRAPHY furnishes us with many instances of persons remarkable for the strength of their memories, which, when we reflect on the extent of that faculty in the generality of mankind, might be considered as fabulous, were not some of them too well attested to be doubted.—Mithridates, who ruled over twenty-two nations, was acquainted with all their

languages, and able to express himself with fluency in each. Cicero, one of the most celebrated orators of ancient Rome, had so happy a memory, that after studying a discourse, though he had not written down a single word of it, he could repeat it exactly in the same manner in which he had composed it. His powers of mind in this respect were really astonishing.