

CALENDAR FOR THE WEEK ENDING SATURDAY  
NOVEMBER 12, 1870.

SUNDAY,	Nov. 6.—	Twenty-first Sunday after Trinity. St. Leonard. Riots at Montreal, 1837. Lincoln elected President, 1860.
MONDAY,	"	7.—Battle of Tippecanoe, 1811. Battle of Mooltan, 1848.
TUESDAY,	"	8.—Milton died, 1674. Battle of Warsaw, 1794.
WEDNESDAY,	"	9.—Arnold at Quebec, 1775. Prince of Wales born, 1841.
THURSDAY,	"	10.—Luther born, 1483. Remarkable dark day and French Cathedral burnt at Montreal, 1819.
FRIDAY,	"	11.—St. Martin, C. Battle of Chrysler's Farm, 1813.
SATURDAY,	"	12.—Montreal taken by the Provincials in the American Rebellion, 1775. Charles Kemble died, 1854.

THE CANADIAN ILLUSTRATED NEWS.

MONTREAL, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1870

RECENT telegraphic reports render all the more certain the prospect of a chain of European entanglements, which from the first breaking out of hostilities seemed a possible result of the war. When the Emperor surrendered at Sedan, we spoke of the event as one which might perhaps render the war equally embarrassing to the Hohenzollern as to the Napoleonic dynasty, for the reason that the action of the Emperor would restore the Republic, or, at least, liberate the—until then—chained demon of Revolution. The world had not long to wait for the first fruits of King William's ill-starred success. Three days after, the Republic was proclaimed in Paris, and in about a fortnight more the head of the recently formed Italian Kingdom, throwing to the winds his obligations contracted by the "September Convention," entered the Papal States and dethroned the Pope from his civil rule. The King pleads as his excuse the force of the Revolution—that gigantic power of national upheaval which Napoleon took by the throat on the 2nd December, 1852, and crushed to the earth and held down for just seventeen years and three quarters!

Yet, all these years Napoleon was the recipient of the rankest abuse from the greatest enemies of the Revolution. Perhaps they were right. We are not the apologists of Napoleon; his schemes may have been chimerical; certainly they were often faulty in their execution, and, perhaps, in their planning, too seldom inspired by a due regard for the rights of *meum* and *tuum*. But wherein is he worse than his brother Sovereigns of the age? Is there not a "Court policy" in the secret archives of every State in Europe? A policy, not of internal progress and external fraternization, but a policy having for its ultimate aim the injury of some neighbour for selfish aggrandisement? The story of Poland is too old to be repeated; of English aggression in India, it were needless to speak. But, to start from the period of the Crimean war, how many plans among European Courts have come to light, quite as dark as the Czar's designs upon the "sick man" of Constantinople? And some of them have been carried out with just as much effrontery as the late Nicholas began his intended scheme of spoliation by throwing his troops into the Principalities for the bland and innocent purpose of securing "material guarantees" for the fulfilment of his requisitions upon the Sublime Porte. This precautionary measure for a satisfactory settlement, was the signal for France and England to strike for the independence of Turkey, or rather for the freedom of the Dardanelles; and the Crimean war, with all its lessons and its well known consequences, was the result.

But in whose hands is the freedom of the Dardanelles to-day? The following despatch, dated London, Nov. 1st, may be, like many other cable despatches, a baseless rumour, though there are weighty reasons for according to it, at least a strong probability of truth. It says:

The decline in the Stock Market yesterday is said to be in consequence of the fact that a Cabinet meeting was called for the purpose of considering what steps should be taken in regard to the continued and formidable armaments of Russia. It is stated that Russia has now five hundred thousand men under arms and ready to take the field in the Western Provinces of the Empire. The story of a secret treaty between Prussia and Russia relative to the eastern question, and that, in the event of peace humiliating to France, Prussia has bound herself by a secret treaty to support the revision of Europe as fixed by the treaty of Paris and the liberation to Russia of the Black Sea with the Dardanelles has been received at Vienna with much feeling and a good deal of circumstantiality. This is expected to be the price demanded by Russia for permitting Germany to move untrammelled upon France. It is further affirmed that as Russia does not care to leave the fulfilment of this treaty to the close of the war she is now insisting that in a treaty with France Prussia shall not secure either the fortresses or a serious reinforcement of her strength on this side of the Rhine. Russian diplomats regard it as essential to the safety of Poland and the progress of the Russian empire westward that Germany shall be left more or less exposed to peril from the side of France. In short it is believed in Vienna, and the signs are that it is

beginning to be believed in London, that Russia having led Germany on thus far in the war until her primary object, the prostration of France, has been accomplished, even more completely than was ever hoped or expected, has meanwhile been preparing herself quietly, and is now prepared to exert such a pressure on both combatants as shall secure to her all her objects in the east without imperilling her European weight.

Were this alleged plot on the part of Russia and Prussia to be carried out, it would follow that, as some authorities have already said, the Crimean war was a mere flagrant waste of life, resulting in no permanent political or commercial advantages to the western nations that engaged in it. But rather it should be said that the abandonment of the policy of maintaining the balance of power among the European States was the mistake which has led to the imminence of catastrophes the ultimate consequences of which few can, in this generation, estimate. It was in defence of the European balance of power, as well as for the protection of Eastern interests, that France and England went to war with Russia. A few years later, the rotten non-intervention theory became popular, and Prussia and Austria profited by it to plunder some of their weaker neighbours. The Italian was followed; and the secret alliance of Napoleon with Prussia, to guarantee the success of the latter, is now no longer a secret; but the unexpected success of Prussia, against a power that had half its troops contending with another enemy in the rear, made the French Emperor change his policy, and suddenly stop the war, the creation of which was probably due in great part to his own connivance. Certainly it is no secret that by his accepting the cession of Venetia from Austria, and by his predominating influence over the revolution-made King of Italy, he spoiled Bismarck's cherished design of marching upon Vienna. It is also a moot-point which no one, unfamiliar with the secrets of Franco-Prussian diplomatic correspondence, can settle, whether Napoleon did not deceive Bismarck or Bismarck Napoleon, in this infamous international intrigue, or whether, at the most modest calculation, one of them did not serve the other as the witches did Macbeth—"Kept the promise to the ear, but broke it to the hope." Surely there was treason between them; for no sooner had peace been concluded than a most irritating diplomatic correspondence sprang up, at the end of which, and for reasons well-known to himself, no doubt, Napoleon patiently devoured his leek, nor let the world see a single grimace over its unwelcome deglutition. That he felt the disadvantage in which Prussia's too great success placed France has been abundantly evident. But his effort to retrieve it has placed France in a still worse position than even Austria was placed by his intrigue, and the Prussian arms, in 1866; Russia this time performing the office for Prussia that France did then.

Is it likely, however, that Bismarck will triumph over the Emperor Alexander as he did over the Emperor Napoleon? We doubt it very much. The Russian Government has already massed five hundred thousand soldiers in the Western Provinces; and this means that its demands upon Prussia must be fulfilled at the cost of war. Now Prussia cannot grapple with such a powerful enemy, either in the midst, or at the conclusion, of the costly struggle in which she is now engaged; hence the conclusion is safe that in bringing about peace and in settling its terms, Russia will have sufficient influence to prevent Prussia from securing territorial or other advantages which would add to its permanent strength. The mutual exhaustion of the combatants is probably what would best satisfy the desires of Russia; and she sees in the strengthening of either a probable foe to her schemes for the future. So long as Prussia is compelled to reserve her strength for a possible conflict with France, so long does Russia feel secure in the West; and if France should be too much paralyzed to take her old part in the role of international affairs, who, with Prussia a consenting party to Russia's Eastern policy, can prevent her from carrying it out? England may regret her policy of non-intervention when she shall have, single-handed, to face such a foe. The archives of the Foreign Office contain warnings of the designs of Russia upon the Eastern possessions of Britain, dating back more than the lifetime of a generation; and these warnings have been time and again renewed since the days when the old Earl of Aberdeen, the Premier of the Coalition Ministry, which, in 1854, reluctantly declared war against Russia, was a young man in the diplomatic service of his country, and in that capacity, foreshadowed with his own pen the coming storm with which, nearly thirty years later, he battled so feebly. We can well understand the "decline in the Stock market," in the face of the well developed designs of the Russian Bear to clutch the key to the East, when France lies bruised and almost broken at the feet of Prussia. The latter power has little concern with other than European affairs; and the way that all the Governments have over-ridden treaties and solemn obligations when their supposed interests or actual de-

sires inspired them to do so, may have taught Prussia the lesson to abandon, to their own devices, those nations who feel that the aggrandisement of Russia would be their loss, so long as, by her tacit consent to Russian aggression, she may be left free to carry out her own designs. This is, at the time of writing, the threatening cloud, but like many others that have floated across the sky with seemingly dire portent, it may be dispersed by the antagonistic current of events propelled by a stronger hand than that of either King or Emperor.

THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORY.

No. 14.—BRITISH COLUMBIA.—FISHERIES, &c.

By the Rev. Aen. McD. Dawson, Ottawa.

The Indians, as becomes them in their uncivilized state, are also well skilled in the barbarous act of spearing salmon. At Nanaimo river they have a most ingenious way of practising this art, and so destroy the finny tribes in a wholesale fashion. Their first operation is the construction of a weir. This done, they place on the lower side of this obstruction to the ascent of salmon, a stone pavement about six feet wide and fourteen long. This pavement, which is made of white or light coloured stones, leads to an opening in the weir. Between two such paved ways the Indians erect a scaffolding or stage, on which these murderous fishermen, lying with their faces downwards, observed at once any salmon that dares to attempt passing over the white stones. It is no sooner seen than a long barbed spear, which is held in readiness, descends on its luckless person.

A still more ingenious mode of spearing is resorted to in the seas of British Columbia. The salmon of this country, although so fastidious in the rivers, readily takes a bait when in salt water. The Indian sets sail in a light canoe, armed with two spears, one of which is about seventy feet in length, the other twenty and with a barbed end. As soon as good fishing ground is reached in some well sheltered strait or inlet, a small cone of wood which has been previously hollowed and trimmed round its larger end with small feathers so as to resemble a shuttlecock, is placed on the point of the longer spear, which is then thrust down, its full length, in the water. The Indian now cleverly jerks off the small cone, which immediately wriggles up, through the water, like a struggling fish. Such a tempting bait can scarcely fail. The wily savage, who holds the short spear, keeps his eye upon it, and, as soon as a salmon rushes at it, the unwary fish is sure to become his prey.

SALMON TROUT.

The most beautiful of this kind of fish is the SALMON TROUT, or, RED SPOTTED SALMON TROUT (*Salmo spectabilis*.) One of its names is derived from the number of bright red spots along its sides. These are interspersed with spots of a yellow colour on a ground of light green which, on the back, is darker, inclining to grey. The head is rather more than a fourth of the whole length. This kind of trout is seldom above three pounds in weight. Its habits are pretty much the same as those of the larger Salmon. Like them it ascends the rivers from the sea, at certain periods of the year, for the purpose of spawning. In October, when it seeks the fresh water, it is seen in vast numbers pouring into all the rivers which flow into Paget's Sound. The Fraser and its tributaries become alive with this pretty little fish. It swarms alike in all the streams, creeks and inlets about Vancouver's Island. The Indians, as may be supposed, do not spare it. In the neighbourhood of all the waters which it is known to frequent, they erect temporary lodges. This is quite a necessary precaution, as all the members of a family engage in the sport, or rather, business, for such it is with the red men. They have two ways of fishing. They use a rod, with hook and line, in true sportsman fashion. They are not very nice, however, in their choice of bait. But they know what is best. They fasten some rather high flavoured salmon roe to their hook,—which is made of bone or hard wood. They never use the roe fresh, but only after it has become tough by drying, and has acquired a rank, oily smell. The fish seize it greedily, and so are captured in great numbers. They succeed equally well with another kind of bait. This consists in a strip, cut from the belly of a trout, which they wind tightly round the hook, keeping the string part outermost, from the barb to about an inch up the line. It is secured by twisting moose hair closely round it. About a foot from the hook thus baited, a small pebble is slung, and the line is fastened to the canoe paddle, close to the hand. The Indian now paddles slowly along, trolling the bait after the canoe. This is, at least, as good an imitation of a small fish as the minnow or spoon bait, which is so much used in Canadian waters. The Indian's contrivance is eminently successful. He secures by it immense numbers of the larger trout. They can be taken also by means of any showy kind of fly. And this is admirable sport.

The other way in which the Indians trap the salmon-trout is not quite so sportsmanlike. And, in any other waters than those of British Columbia, where the supply of fish appears to be inexhaustible, would have the effect of exterminating this beautiful variety of the Salmonidae. Baskets of various dimensions, some of them fifteen feet in length, and six in circumference, are woven of split vine-maple and strips of cedar bark. These are placed in the centre of the stream, with dams of lattice work extending on each side to the banks, so