the Constituent Assembly in 1791. In 1831 the Jewish clergy were declared to be beneficiaries of the fund set apart by the French Government for the purposes of religion. And so M. Giron, having established that there is complete equality in France and other enlightened countries to-day between "les Juiss et les non-Juiss," claims that the former should be treated "non comme des pourceaux, mais comme des hommes; non comme des étrangers ou des ennemis, mais comme des fréres et des concitoyens."

While Mr. Chamberlain and Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman were splitting hairs and evolving the haziest nuances of difference in the meanings of "suzerainty" and "paramountcy" from the standpoint of international law, Oom Paul was preparing in the most practical way to cut the Gordian knot for them. There is not the slightest doubt that England is justified in her conduct towards the Boers by the comity of nations. Their attitude was simply incompatible with the maintenance of peace and good government in the valious South African communities, and by the common consent of all fair-minded publicists Great Britain is the proper party to wield the policeman's baton. 'Tis a pity that the baton was not used a little earlier in the proceedings.

We commend to the perusal of our old professional friend "Laudator Temporis Acti" the article entitled "The Golden Age of Law" in the last number of the Law Magazine and Review. It will prove interesting to him, providing he withstands the shock of the opening paragraph, which contains the following: "It is impossible to imagine how anyone who has read Lord Campbell's Lives, the State Trials, and such important legal works as Stephen's History of the Criminal Law can ever regard the past with feelings other than those of profound disgust."

After the following observations of Strong, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Exchequer Appeal of The Queen v. Grenier, we imagine that the case of the Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Vogel, 11 S.C.R. 623 will be treated by the profession as relegated to the shades of oblivion: "For the reasons I gave in Vogel's case, I am of opinion that a wrong construction of the clause in question (sec. 246(3) of the Railways Act) in that case prevailed by the majority of a single voice. \* \* Since the case of Robertson v. G.T.R. Co., (24 S.C.R. p. 615) it would seem that