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The distinction between the written law (sus scriptum) and the unwritten law (jus non scriptum)(j), depends upon the mode of formation, and not, as one might suppose, upon the material fact of the writing. The jus scriptum is that law which is produced by one of the public authorities invested with a legislative rôle, and which will, as a rule, be reduced to writing; the jus non

stance, the difficulty is to know whether the texts which attribute a rule to the jus gentium do so in the technical sense, meaning that it is one of which non-citizens may avail themselves, or in the vague sense, meaning that it exists everywhere. The Institutes, say, fc example 1, 3, De j. pers., 2, that slavery pertains to the jus gentium, while there seems scarcely any doubt that dominica potestas is peculiar to the citizens. There is, I believe, to say the least, much exaggeration in the theory according to which the jus gentium would comprise a sort of importation made at Rome, notably after the second Punic war, of the law of the most important non-Latin people with whore the Romans then came into relation, that is to say, the Hellenic populations of Magna Graecia, of Sicily, or of still more distant places (Gide, Condition privée de la femme, 2nd ed., 1885, p. 127 et seq.). As Pernice justly observes, the really Greek institutions of commercial law were grafted only with difficulty upon the institutions of the jus gentium, which had been already established before them, and independently of them: the nauticum faenus upon the mutuum, the lew Rhodia de jactu upon the law of letting, the hypotheca, if it comes from Grecce, upon pledge. The institutions of the jus gentium developed rather in an independent manner within the Roman State in consequence of the juxta-position of Roman citizens and subject foreigners, especially, as I hold, after the lex Aebutia, and almost exclusively in the matter of property and personal rights (patrimoine).

(j) Ulpian, D., 1, 1, De j. et j., 6, 1=Inst., 1, 2, De j. nat., 3. Cf. A. Bernice, Z.S. St. 20, 1899, pp. 162-171.