

was little difficulty in refuting these arguments in favour of deleting the item from the agenda and the Soviet motion was comfortably defeated by a vote of 17 to 3 with 3 abstentions.

3. This left the way open for a general discussion on the safeguards principles and procedures. By advance agreement among the suppliers' group the United States delegation opened that discussion with a reasonable and conciliatory statement. They said that they had examined all the comments and proposals put forward in the General Conference. They had concluded from that examination that a substantial majority of the membership of the Agency endorsed the principles and procedures to which the Board had given provisional approval. For their part, the United States believed that those principles and procedures represented a reasonable and workable compromise although they appreciated that others regarded them as capable of improvement while still others continued to call for an entirely different approach. It was right for the Board at this stage to put the safeguards document into effect so as to be able to deal with pending requests for Agency assistance and to let all member states know what safeguards they might expect to be attached to assistance which they might seek from the Agency in future.

4. The United States delegation did not think that the system which had been evolved was an unreasonable one or that it was likely to be implemented in an arbitrary fashion. The United States were prepared to apply comparable safeguards in their bilateral transactions and hoped that other members of the Agency would do likewise. It should be remembered, however, that it was the object of the Agency's safeguards to prevent a diversion of Agency assistance to military purposes. The United States did not think, therefore, that an adequate system of safeguards and inspections in relation to international disarmament could be modelled on the Agency's safeguards. They did think, however, that in adopting its own system of safeguards the Agency could provide encouragement for those who were trying to work out solutions to the more complex problems involving the military use of atomic energy.

5. The ensuing discussion afforded the opponents of safeguards one more opportunity of registering their objections to the document that was before the Board for approval and, by implication, to the safeguards concept as such. Although these objections are by now more than familiar to you, it is perhaps worthwhile restating the main line of argument for the record. This is that safeguards are both unnecessary and discriminatory. They are unnecessary in that they are likely to affect only countries which come to the Agency for assistance. Almost by definition these will be countries that are not at a stage where they are capable of producing nuclear weapons. In other words safeguards will be directed towards protecting the world community against risks that are non-existent. In the process, they may dissuade countries that need help from coming to the Agency to meet their requirements. If countries nevertheless do decide to seek assistance from the Agency, they are likely to find that safeguards will inhibit and interfere with their programmes for the peaceful development of nuclear energy. What is more objectionable, however, is that safeguards in their overall effect are bound to be discriminatory. That is because they would divide the world even more sharply into those who are producing nuclear weapons and those who are not, with the former being in a position by means of safeguards to control the latter. If safeguards are to be acceptable, therefore, they must form part of a comprehensive system which would have as its object the cessation of nuclear tests and the banning of the production of nuclear weapons on a basis of universal application.

6. Much was inevitably made in the discussion of that paragraph in the resolution of the General Conference in which the Board had been asked "to take into account as appropriate the views expressed in the General Conference." Those who have consistently opposed the adoption of any safeguards document tried to argue that this resolution called upon the Board to bring the document into line with what had been said at the General Conference. If the