

Indians really expect our support in helping North to use Commission for propaganda sounding board when Commission has consistently refused to consider South's charges of subversion which are South's defence in most of these cases.

6. Basic disagreement between Canadian and Indian delegates appears to be that we feel Commission must deal with its responsibilities if it is to be effective and to retain respect of parties whereas Indians appear to believe Commission can be effective only so long as it does nothing.

7. It seems clear Indians would like to close their eyes to what is happening here. Struggle for possession of South Vietnam is becoming more intense and in the process lines are becoming more clearly drawn. Whatever advantages of neutrality for Laos may be, neutrality is clearly not repeat possibility for South Vietnam. In their decisions here Indians are being forced to come down on one side or the other and it is their obvious distress at their exposed position that they are revealing in complaints about our lack of objectivity.

725.

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*Le haut-commissaire en Inde
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in India
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 348

New Delhi, April 29, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Repeat for Information: Saigon (Priority), London, Washington from Ottawa.

VIETNAM SUBVERSION

After first meeting of Laos Commission I reminded Commonwealth Secretary Gundevia of his prediction that Vietnam Commission could now deal effectively with such problems as subversion. He asked "Why do you bring this matter up again now?" I replied it was important before Geneva Conference started to regain some of the confidence which had been lost in the present type of Commission by many failures during past months to take specific action in Vietnam. Gundevia insisted USSR would lose whatever confidence would be gained by the USA. He did not repeat not agree that we actually had any agreement about a subversion statement. I referred him to Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai with whom he said he had not repeat not discussed matter but would now do so. When I said we did not repeat not like to make minority statement Gundevia commented "If Canada did not repeat not make statement the Poles would and result would in any case be criticism of Indian Chairman." I asked if I should report this as his final conclusion. He promised further consideration.

2. During initial negotiations on subversion with Gundevia I accepted his procrastination thinking he needed time to become familiar with subject new to him. Now I have reluctantly concluded that he never had any intention of keeping any of his series of promises (over many cups of tea) made to avoid a definite reply. Krishna Menon, who was also present at first Commission meeting has probably turned thumbs down on a joint Indian-Canadian subversion statement.

3. I am not repeat not in position to advise whether or not repeat not concrete results from a minority statement would repay us at this time for whatever effect our action may have upon Indian-Canadian co-operation in Laos Commission.

[C.A.] RONNING