

continue hostilities in the American Colonies, there is no reason to apprehend that France, Spain and America, will be an over-match for Great Britain. The same annual expence, which was laid out in the American quarrel, will be sufficient to carry on the naval war proposed, and enable us to out-number our adversaries in ships of the line; and I am apt to think that the depredations of our King's ships and privateers, if they do not supply us with funds, will certainly supply us with spirit to pursue it. We know very well from former trials what France and Spain can effect; and the assistance of America in such a war, considering her present circumstances, will be of little importance: they have no ships of great size, and are not yet in a condition to fit them out; besides, when they learn our intention of giving no disturbance to their trade, it is probable that, in their present exhausted condition, they will yield but a feeble assistance to their allies.

2. It may be supposed that the Americans will not yield up that material point of sovereignty to the King of Great Britain, the power of making peace and war; and that they will not choose to be involved in every quarrel in which our Sovereign may choose to be engaged. It is likely, however, that after so long a course of warfare,
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