

in advance of the Americans. After the next series of British and American nuclear tests are finished this summer, many individuals here will be eager to see a halt by the Western powers, whether or not this is deemed a reply to the Soviet test-ban proposal. The British Government is determined to keep in step with Washington, no matter what the outcome will be. The ability of Britain to justify suspension of tests at this stage will depend on whether the United States revises the McMahon Act. One piece of American legislation of extreme concern to the British Government at the moment is the Eisenhower administration bill to amend the McMahon Act. This 1946 act makes it unlawful for the United States to share atomic secrets even with its best allies. Today the British are anxious that the proposed revisions, calling for exchanges of certain information under certain conditions, be accepted.

Much of the nuclear information Britain seeks is almost certainly known to American experts now and could be provided if the secrecy provisions of the act were eased. However, officials in the United States realize how serious could be reservations about calling a halt to tests even after the summer series, and some probably understand why. It is also expected that France will not agree to suspension until she has had a chance to test her own bomb. So Britain really is sending out two signals on both talks and tests. The official one is loud, clear and firmly in line with alliance policies; the unofficial one, if less clear, likewise is loud in protest that official policies are too negative. The desire of the common man on the Western side, declares the *Times* of London, forthrightly, "is to cut the cackle and get on with the job".

The matter of a summit conference is very important to Canada, and at present the Government has taken it very, very seriously. Our Prime Minister has invited the powers to hold the conference in this country, and he should be praised for this action. As of the Christian and Judaic faiths, we believe in a Divine Providence and being gifted with free will, which debars the complex of fatalism. We believe that the Almighty leaves us free in our actions, but if humanity decided to use those terrifying machines of destruction invented by human science and invention, in a worldwide conflagration, which would undoubtedly destroy our civilization, as we know it now, for centuries to come, who would dare to believe that God would interfere to stop such a cataclysm that had been willed by the human mind? The survival of man's destiny on this planet cannot rest on hope of such intervention.

We desire with all our hearts that such a conference will succeed, because in this country we desire and pray for peace and we will continue to do so until it is obtained. But if new promises and solemnly signed agreements result from negotiations with the Soviet Union, "to reduce East-West tensions", how much trust can the free world put in the good faith of the Reds? This is an all-important question on the international scene today. The only way to answer it would be to examine the Kremlin's record of performance on past agreements, and this has to be repeated time and time again so that we will not forget it. However, time will not permit me to do this, but the facts are well known to every member of this house and so I will make just a few remarks on this subject.

In our dealings with Soviet Russia in the fifteen years since President Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill met Premier Stalin in Tehran, three Presidents of the United States and six United States Secretaries of State have engaged in 19 high level talks with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Government. Out of these talks came some 40 agreements involving specific Soviet promises. Of these, 37 were cynically violated. In the spring of 1955 a fully documented study of nearly 1,000 Soviet treaties was made public by the United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. The U.S.S.R., the study showed, "had broken its word to virtually every country to which it ever gave a signed promise."

Let us consider for a moment the summit meeting in July 1955 when President Eisenhower and the Prime Ministers of Britain and France went to Geneva. Rarely had a conference with the Soviets been approached with greater optimism. Said the Right Honourable R. A. Butler, then Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer:

There is in the international scene today a feeling of spring after a long winter of discontent.

The proceedings were loud with the rhetoric of good will.

The end product of this charade of amiability was three generalized "directives" to the Foreign Ministers, instructed to meet in the same city three months later:

(1) The settlement of the German problem and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections;

(2) A "system for the control and reduction of all armaments and armed forces under effective safeguards", to be worked out by the United Nations Disarmament Commission; and

(3) Gradual lifting of the iron curtain through more "free contacts and exchanges".

But the "feeling of spring" evaporated at the Foreign Ministers' gathering in the fall as soon as Molotov parted his thin lips to emit wintry blasts. He bitterly denounced suggestions for freer exchanges of persons as