

voting a negative or talking obstructively—will be promptly followed by sending the politicians to their masters—the people of Canada.

The CHAIRMAN: The time of the hon. member has expired.

Mr. HUGHES: I had a few more remarks to make—

Mr. BORDEN: Go on.

Mr. HUGHES: I do not wish to transgress. I simply desire to state again that the Government would be well advised to follow the course that the Montreal Star so ably advocates, and that the right hon. gentleman himself promised to follow.

Mr. H. B. AMES: I had not intended to participate in this debate, but certain remarks have been made by the hon. member for Kings, P.E.I. (Mr. Hughes), which make it necessary for me to put on 'Hansard' in its entirety just what the right hon. the First Lord of the Admiralty said on the 31st of March, 1913, when he introduced the naval estimates for 1913-14. This is the last official utterance of the recognized head of the British navy. Naval situations change from time to time. The kaleidoscope does not always show the same view. The last official utterance should be given very weighty consideration by this House. Mr. Winston Churchill, in his remarks on the 31st of March in the British House of Commons when presenting his supply for naval estimates, distinctly showed that in his own mind the British fleet could be divided into two parts and would naturally fall into two parts, namely: the North sea fleet, which was expressly intended to protect the British Isles; and, secondly, what he spoke of as his world-wide-service fleet that might be located at Gibraltar or elsewhere, but whose particular duty it should be to preserve the channels of ocean commerce and to look after the various British possessions not immediately adjoining the North sea. His remarks have been referred to by the hon. Minister of Finance and several other members, but have never before been placed on 'Hansard' in their entirety. Mr. Winston Churchill said that up to the year 1914 the 60 per cent standard had been provided for. Then he goes on to say:

That is quite sufficient for the year 1915, with which we are at present dealing, but, having regard to the responsibilities of the British Empire both in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean, and having regard in particular to the new development of forces in the Mediterranean, it is clear that the margin of strength available for the whole world service of the British Empire will not be sufficient after the first quarter of 1916 unless further steps are taken either by the dominions or by ourselves. From the point of view, the reality of the need of the three

Canadian vessels can be well appreciated. They would raise the margin of the strength available for the general defence of the Empire, after the main need in home waters has been met, as follows: 1915, in the fourth quarter, 10; 1916, in the first quarter, 13; in the second quarter, 8; in the third quarter, 8; in the fourth quarter, 10; 1917, in the first quarter, 12, and so on, an average of 9 or 10 vessels available for the whole world service of the British Empire. That, in the absence of further developments in the Mediterranean or in the Pacific beyond what is now in prospect, would be sufficient. If, however, new developments took place of such a kind as to affect Admiralty problems, or if the Canadian ships were to miscarry for any reason, the situation would have to be reviewed. It is unnecessary at the present moment, and it would be premature for me to say any more on the subject. I have given the fullest information in my power to the House, and I hope I shall not be pressed to add to it. I could not accede to such a request. It is necessary, however, to make it clear that the three ships now under discussion in Canada are absolutely required from 1916 onwards for the whole world defence of the British Empire, apart altogether from the needs of Great Britain in Home waters; that they will play a real part in the defence of the Empire; and that, if they fail, a gap will be opened to fill which further sacrifices will have to be made without undue delay by others.

With these facts in view, I ask the House seriously: Is it not unwise for some people on one side of the House to say that the Canadian ships are redundant, superfluous, and an unnecessary burden—(Hon. members: 'No'—and it is equally unwise for other people on the other side to say that they ought to be redundant, superfluous, and an unnecessary burden? Both these views seem to me to be equally wrong and equally harmful to our interests, and I must repeat that the Canadian ships are absolutely necessary for the whole world defence of the British Empire from the end of 1915, or from the beginning of 1916 onwards. The fact that they are necessary is no measure of their value. Their value far exceeds the value of three ships. We can build three ships ourselves if necessary. Parliament has never refused to supply the money for that which responsible ministers have considered necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Crown. It is the fact of this great new nation coming forward, with all its measureless strength and possibility, to testify to the enduring life of the British Empire that has already produced an impression throughout the world of more value than many dreadnought ships, an impression which throughout the world conduces both to the safety of this country and to the peace of the nations.

There is the frank admission on the one part of Mr. Winston Churchill that it will be a great disappointment to Great Britain if these three ships that we advocate are not added to that worldwide service. If they are not added, some other part of the British Empire will have to step into the