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armed services, for specialists had to be drawn from units and formations already committed to other tasks. While the personnel were well trained in their technical duties, they had been taught, as part of their regular training, to think and act as fighting soldiers. In a peace-keeping role, largely passive and supervisory in nature, the troops were called upon to perform unaccustomed and difficult duties, often without clear directions.

I do not wish to leave the impression that the Canadian armed services in both the Suez and the Congo did not respond to United Nations needs with speed, efficiency, tact and inventiveness. The opposite is true the They were magnificent. What I do suggest is that the launching of these two the vital peace-keeping operations - from the point of view both of the United Nations and of participating countries - would have been accomplished more easily and effectively if steps had been taken in advance to ensure technical and other forms of preparation for this kind of peace keeping.

Now I am aware that earlier conditions are not likely to be duplicated when the United Nations embarks on a peace-keeping mission. The nat political circumstances vary; the composition of the force usually has to be smo adjusted to suit them; the climate and terrain in the area of operations may of be quite different.

We also have to recognize that the kind of United Nations presence Nat required may vary greatly from situation to situation. Mr. Hammarskjold spot 499 about the "uniqueness of the UNEF setting". He maintained that such a force could not have been deployed in Lebanon or in Jordon in 1958, although there was a need for other forms of United Nations presence on these occasions in and which unarmed military observers were able to play a significant part in restoring stability. Similar operations - but with local variations - were carried out more recently in West New Guinea and in Yemen.

dec The method of operation has to be adapted to each situation. The truce-supervision teams in Kashmir and Palestine investigate complaints about men val incidents; the observers in Lebanon, moving about in jeeps and helicopters, sought to check the illegal entry of arms and infiltrations. In Gaza, UNEF ope had been stationed at fixed posts. In the buffer zone and in Sinai it has engaged in mobile reconnaissance of the ground and in the air. In the Congo the force has occupied key points in the main centres of the country. some areas, the task has been one of patrolling demilitarized zones; in others of calming and controlling local populations; and, in still others, of persufor opposing factions to refrain from hostile acts.

The very fact that forces are composed of national contingents withdom their own military traditions and methods and disciplines adds to the comple of of the operation. Language can be a barrier, and problems of supply a diffinity The many variations which occur require careful organization, through training and standardization of procedure.

But, in spite of all the difficulties and differences, the shocks the .bro and surprises, the United Nations has shown itself capable of brilliant impri Tisis sation and has succeeded in making its peace-keeping presence effective. record of achievement has been good; all the more so because it was never position to be prepared.