

taken or even attempted, should be held the day after tomorrow. My own experience confirms the view that conferences without careful preparation often do more harm than good.

In this essential preparatory work of consultation and in the reaching of decisions about this problem of what to do about Germany now that EDC has gone, the NATO Council should, I think, be used to the utmost. This does not mean, of course, that special negotiations by the three occupying powers may not have to be carried on with the Bonn Government, whose agreement is essential for any kind of NATO solution of the problem; or that a preliminary meeting, such as that prepared for London, might not be useful. It does mean, however, that every member of NATO, whose agreement would be required, and all of whom are vitally interested in the problem, should, for a solution. Canada certainly expects to play such a part, as a NATO member with substantial air and land forces in Europe; indeed in Germany itself.

Views, though they are bound at this stage to be preliminary, are already being exchanged between us and certain other NATO Governments, both on question of procedure and substance. This is the kind of normal diplomatic operation which occurs between friendly governments before conferences meet and decisions are reached. When you read that it has already resulted in an "Empire row" between the United Kingdom and Canada, you can dismiss that as the kind of exuberant exaggeration which seems to sell some newspapers.

We hope that our own ideas on both procedure and substance may make a useful contribution to the common pool from which a good solution may emerge. Indeed, it must emerge, and soon, if the Atlantic alliance, and with it our best hope for preventing aggression, is to be kept strong; or, possibly, even, to be maintained at all. The stakes are as high as that. It is, therefore, no cause for surprise that all the governments concerned, including the Canadian, are approaching this problem with earnestness and resolve.

To achieve success in this task, as indeed in the greater effort, of which this is a part, of keeping peace in the world, it is essential, though it is not always easy, to adapt our political and our economic thinking to the realities of an age which is almost as remote from 1939 as it is from 1966. When, for instance, we talk of fear lest one country in an alliance might rearm too quickly and dominate a neighbour, that fear is based on the picture of armies on the march, with guns and tanks. But domination today is expressed, materially, that is in terms of scientists and engineers, with megaton bombs and jet propelled means of delivering them quickly to the ends of the earth.

In political terms, and this also is not easy to grasp or adapt one's thinking to, this may ultimately and up to the ultimate necessity of the union, for security, even for survival, of free European states in an Atlantic coalition which will be strong enough to prevent aggression and wise enough to use that strength for peace.

If from the failure of EDC we can gain renewed impetus to that larger and greater goal, then, indeed, out of this set-back good may finally come.