

made available through Red Cross channels approximately \$3 million in food and other relief supplies. Particular attention has been paid to means of delivering relief to the rebel area. The Canadian Government has held that the most effective way of doing this on an emergency basis would be by means of well-scheduled daylight flights. The Government raised this issue with both sides towards the end of 1968, and throughout 1969 continued to support efforts to work out an agreement on daylight flights.

On June 5, 1969, an aircraft of the International Committee of the Red Cross was shot down, and the ICRC flights that had been taking place at night were subsequently suspended. Thereafter the ICRC devoted patient effort to working out with both parties an agreement on daylight flights. The Canadian Government supported these ICRC efforts. In July, the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced a Canadian offer to provide inspectors of relief cargoes in order to meet rebel contentions that daylight flights would prejudice their military position. The ICRC and the Nigerian Federal Military Government signed an agreement in Lagos in September allowing daylight relief flights for an initial period of three weeks. The secessionist regime rejected this agreement, demanding a third-party guarantee that would ensure that daylight flights were not used to military advantage by Nigeria. The Governments of Canada and the United States immediately attempted to provide assurances to meet this declared fear of military disadvantage. Included as one element of the assurances was a proposal for Canadian observers to travel on board relief aircraft. The "Biafran" authorities formally rejected them in October.

Canada has also continued to support practical and useful initiatives designed to encourage the two sides to move towards a negotiated settlement. In the belief that the conciliatory spirit required to effect a peaceful settlement of the dispute could not be imposed from outside but must come from the parties themselves, the Canadian Government repeatedly impressed upon their representatives the need for negotiation. Canada also supported the efforts of others, in particular the Organization of African Unity, to promote peace talks.

The Canadian Government has maintained the view that no one should send arms to the Nigerian war theater. On several occasions during 1969, both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs explained to leaders of other countries, including Britain and the Soviet Union, Canadian policy toward the Nigerian conflict.

The Canadian delegation at the United Nations thoroughly explored the possibilities for raising the humanitarian aspect of the Nigerian civil war in that forum. However, after extensive consideration including discussions with the United Nations Secretary-General, the Government came to the conclusion that any move by Canada to have the issue raised there would be an unhelpful and empty gesture, which would not contribute to the search for a peaceful solution.