
¹³ Albert Wohlstetter, who helped to develop the theory, himself never fully accepted it, but it nevertheless became the conceptual basis for Washington's approach to strategic stability and arms control. See Marc Trachtenberg, *History & Strategy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp.20-25. For examples of MAD theory see Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961) and Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961).

¹⁴ See his commentary in Ashton B. Carter and David S. Schwartz Eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense*, (Washington DC: Brookings, 1984), p.400.

¹⁵ David S. Yost, *Soviet Missile Defense and the Western Alliance*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp.47-48. Colin Gray maintains that "Soviet strategists always believed that missile and air defences were important" and that they accepted constraints on ballistic missile defence in 1972 because of Soviet technological non-competitiveness "not strategic philosophical opposition to active defense." *Modern Strategy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.341.

¹⁶ Michael J. Mazarr, *Missile Defences and Asia-Pacific Security*, (New York: St. Martin's, 1989), pp.3-6. Even in the relatively stable environment of superpower stalemate, the ABM regime clearly did not deliver on the promise of broader arms-control agreements. In the sixteen years following the signing of the ABM Treaty the Soviet deployed four new types of ICBMs, five new classes of ballistic missile submarines along with five types of submarine-launched missiles, all the while spending as much on strategic defense as on offensive systems. Hence, long before Reagan was inaugurated these facts had presented the United States "with both a strategic and arms control rationale for reconsidering adherence to the ABM Treaty." See Robert M. Soofer, *Missile Defenses and Western European Security: NATO Strategy, Arms Control, and Deterrence*, (Westport: Greenwood, 1988), pp.87-102, p.157.

¹⁷ *The Economist*, March 16, 1996, p.39.

¹⁸ Bingham Kennedy Jr., "Curbing Chinese Missile Sales: From Imposing to Negotiating China's Adherence to the MTCR," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol.15, No.1, 1996, pp.57-69; Paul Mann, "No Breakthrough on Chinese Proliferation," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Vol.156, No.10, 2002, pp.57-60.

¹⁹ A number of ambiguous definitions exist of a term that seeped into American diplomatic parlance during the Clinton administration. Here, "rogue state" refers to *a state that puts a high priority on subverting other states and sponsoring non-conventional types of violence against them. It does not react predictably to deterrence or other tools of diplomacy and statecraft.* See Barry Rubin, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Rogue States," *MERIA Journal*, Vol. 3, No.3, September 1999.

²⁰ The Clinton administration announced that it would decide on the if-and-what of a U.S. NMD deployment in the summer of 2000 yet ultimately opted to leave the choice to Clinton's successor.

²¹ Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 18, 1998. <http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/105thcongress/BMThreat.htm>; Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001 The QDR's vision of American defense priorities is based in part on the widening gyre of challenges to U.S. interests at home abroad, the consequence of which is a policy shift away from threat-based to capabilities-based defense planning. The United States is today less concerned with who might threaten its security and that of its allies as with increasing diversity in *how* threats will manifest themselves, including missile attack. A capabilities-based defense necessarily broadens the strategic perspective of the security policy of any state, but it requires sweeping change from a superpower with global interests.

²² *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, p.42. Moreover, missile defence specifically and the contents of the QDR generally do not reflect the totality of flux in thinking about security issues going on in Washington