

To be clubworthy is to go by the standards of the club in question. These are largely but not wholly standards of proper procedure. To become a member in good standing is to take such standards to heart, so much so as to become or appear to become different in some significant way. Conversely, not to live by them is to face disapproval, shame, loss of opportunity, and exclusion. Where Russia is concerned, we are talking not only about incentives to behave like a member, but about processes that over time are capable of modifying Russia's identity by making it part of a community of judgment from which it previously stood aside. The word that sums up these processes is enculturation.

It is through enculturation, as well as material incentives, that Russia will come to take more care with nuclear safety and environmental protection (Griffiths, 1996, pp. 36-37). Disposition can be viewed as an instrument of enculturation, in addition to its being a tool of physical and political security. A strategy of sustained disposition will therefore be one of indirection as well as direct action for safety and the environment in Russia. It will recognize that nuclear responsibility is a by-product of larger forces and relationships which are capable of changing Russian procedures and aspects of the Russian identity without making Russians over into Westerners. The strategy will be aware that relationships which are created in the work of disposition may have as much or more to add to sustainability than getting the details of the programme right in the first place. All of this bears directly on what we should expect of the entity that will be required to execute a Multilateral Agreement.

A Multinational Management Corporation

Left to fend for themselves in today's Russia, nuclear safety and environmental protection as two of our troika of conditionalities would not fare well. Donors cannot therefore be as confident as they should that a disposition programme very largely in Russian hands will bring no harm to Russia. Irreversibility as a third dimension of conditionality could also be vulnerable to environmental or safety mishap or disaster which served to disable the programme as a whole. In no way can we examine even a fraction of all the contingencies in seeking to make the troika fare better. Instead, a broad understanding is required.

From what's been said thus far, three conditions are lacking: a political and also business culture that makes for appropriate care in matters affecting safety and the environment; a forceful as distinct from a hobbled regulator, this even more in the case of the environment than for nuclear safety; and a civil society that's able to make a difference in ensuring that government and business do what's in the public interest as distinct from the interests of a state monopoly. Agency for change is certainly there, but none of these deficiencies is going to be righted in Russia any time soon.

Unless again the Russian side is very persuasive, donors will have to impart needed agency themselves if Russia is adequately to be protected, and if the programme is to be sustained against adversity over the long haul. The best way to do this is with a multinational disposition management corporation, control over which would be transferred to a Russian counterpart entity as benchmarks were met.