

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

With respect to monitoring the chemical industry, the proposal made by eight non-aligned delegations in July was a major advance. It preserves key features of the regime that is currently set forth in article VI of the "rolling text", but closes an important loophole that would have allowed many relevant facilities to escape inspection. As a result of the eight-delegation proposal the Ad Hoc Committee has almost reached consensus to extend the monitoring provisions in Article VI to all CW-capable facilities. Work remains to delimit the industry and exclude those not posing a risk and to work out the inspection regime, but we believe that the general support for coverage of such facilities should be reflected in appendix I of the "rolling text".

Much discussion has taken place on the selection process for facilities to be inspected. We, and many others, believe that the selection process must reflect security interests. Given the many thousands of relevant facilities, States parties must play a role in designating facilities for inspection. This approach is not challenge inspection in disguise. These inspections are routine, and will be conducted accordingly. We recognize the concerns of others about abuse through national selection and believe that safeguards must be incorporated, for instance agreed limits on the annual number of inspections in a given State. We are grateful for the work of the Chairman of Group B on this issue, and will give his proposed approach careful study.

Some have argued that the composition and decision-making process of the executive council can be settled only at the end of these negotiations. We believe, on the contrary, that broad consensus is developing in the Committee, and that agreement on the structure and operations of this vital executive body will help us settle other, more substantive, issues. We believe there is broad support for an executive council of approximately 20 to 25 members. Selection would be based on a combination of geographical and industrial criteria. Decision-making on substantive issues would be by a qualified majority. Several delegations have already expressed views on the executive council and we hope that Working Group C can take this up immediately.

The fourth major issue that I want to discuss is universality. How can the Conference structure the convention to encourage all States to join? I want to express my agreement with my distinguished Argentine colleague, Ambassador García Moritán, who noted last week that a chemical weapons convention is primarily a security agreement. Other delegations have pointed out the need to include restrictions and disincentives for countries who, after a reasonable period of time, choose to remain outside. We strongly agree. We have proposed that, after a suitable transition period, arrangements for trade in CW-related chemicals should discriminate against non-parties. Our proposal will require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with all States that do not become parties to the CW convention within a reasonable period of time. These provisions relate directly to the central purpose of the convention, and to the security of future States parties. We will ask for your support on these grounds.