

(Mr. Vajnar, Czechoslovakia)

A number of issues have been discussed thoroughly, and on some of them certain progress has been achieved. In particular the material included for further consideration in the annex on chemicals seems to lead us towards progress on some technical issues which have either not been discussed or have been considered without much success in recent years. Our delegation supports active continuation of this work and hopes that the results, once agreed, will be incorporated into the structure of the "rolling text" in a way which will not weaken but rather streamline and strengthen it.

The discussion on the "verification pattern" can hardly be described as conclusive. However, it was useful in so far as it confirmed, in our opinion, that sufficient clarity regarding the whole verification concept of the chemical weapons convention can only be achieved when basic types of control activities which have been suggested and discussed for years are finalized and subscribed to by all participants to the negotiations. We expect that the national and international trial inspections now under way will soon contribute to the completion of procedures for systematic routine inspections. Czechoslovakia is prepared to offer a facility for such an inspection. While we agree that such inspections should be well prepared, we do not think that certain divergences in approaches to individual MTIs will necessarily be detrimental. We suggest that there is no need to be afraid of possible conflicting situations. Their identification and thorough evaluation afterwards might be more useful for the accurate completion of the chemical weapons convention than scrupulous avoidance of problem areas during the stage of multilateral trial inspections. We therefore do not favour unduly postponing MTIs, and my country would be prepared to accept an international team of inspectors as early as during the CD's summer session.

Challenge inspections also require our attention during the summer session. Some consider this kind of inspection to be confrontational and politically charged; others maintain that they will constitute just another form of verification, which could be regularly applied. In some cases, perhaps in most of them, these inspections might operate in an ordinary and smooth way. In other cases elements of confrontation may be present, depending on the rationale justifying a request, the participants in the challenge process or the conclusions of the inspection. However, what is important is an agreement on all the procedures, so that they stipulate clearly the rights and obligations of the States parties, the role and activities of inspectors, and the process after the conduct of a challenge inspection.

At the same time we would not like to underrate the complexity of article IX. A number of approaches have evolved in recent years, and a lack of clarity is evident in the positions of more than just a couple of delegations. Indeed, it would be interesting to know whether the authors of CD/500 still subscribe unconditionally to all the relevant provisions contained in this document, or whether their approach to some of them has been modified. Occasionally we are under the impression that the mandatory nature of such inspections would not necessarily mean an unconditional obligation to accept such an inspection at the request of any of the States parties without the right of refusal. Our delegation also wonders whether inspection on challenge is regarded by the United States delegation as applicable to any